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Abstract
We analyse a two-echelon discrete lot-sizing problem with a supplier and a retailer under infor-
mation asymmetry. We assume that all cost parameters are time independent and that the retailer
has single-dimensional continuous private information, namely either his setup cost or his holding
cost. The supplier uses mechanism design to determine a menu of contracts that minimises his ex-
pected costs, where each contract specifies the retailer’s procurement plan and a side payment to the
retailer. There is no restriction on the number of contracts in the menu.
To optimally solve this contracting problem we present a two-stage approach, based on a theo-
retical analysis. The first stage generates a list of procurement plans that is sufficient to solve the
contracting problem to optimality. The second stage optimally assigns these plans to the retailer
types and determines all side payments. The result is an optimal menu with finitely many contracts
that pools retailer types. We identify cases for which the contracting problem can be solved in
polynomial time and provide the corresponding algorithms. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that
information asymmetry leads to atypical structures in the plans of the optimal menu, e.g., plans vio-
lating the zero-inventory property. Our solution approach and several results are directly applicable
to more general problems as well.
1 Introduction
We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer under a discrete lot-
sizing setting with asymmetric information. The supply chain must come to an agreement for a joint
procurement plan to satisfy market demand for a single indivisible product for a given time horizon. We
assume that the market demand can be modelled as demand in discrete time periods and is known up
front, leading to a discrete lot-sizing problem for the supply chain. That is, the joint procurement plan
specifies the following for each time period up to the planning horizon. For the supplier, the options are
to produce new products, to keep products in inventory for later time periods, and to transfer products
to the retailer. For the retailer, these are to receive products from the supplier, to keep products in
inventory, and to satisfy market demand. We assume all market demand must be satisfied and back-
ordering is not allowed.
If all information is shared among the two parties in the supply chain, we have the traditional joint
lot-sizing problem, which is well known and analysed thoroughly in the literature, e.g., in Zangwill
(1969). We consider the case where there is only partial cooperation between the supplier and the
retailer. Namely, the retailer has private information on his cost structure that he does not share with
the supplier. Furthermore, we assume that the supplier and the retailer both act individually rationally
and want to minimise their own costs. This partial cooperation typically leads to inefficiencies for the
supply chain, see for example Inderfurth et al. (2013) and Perakis and Roels (2007). However, we consider
the problem from the supplier’s point of view, who wants to minimise his own costs, and thus perfect
supply chain coordination is not a goal.
We assume that the supply chain uses a pull ordering strategy, i.e., the retailer has the initiative
and the market power to place orders at the supplier. The supplier must satisfy these orders. Hence,
by default the retailer will order according to his own individually optimal procurement plan, which is
typically suboptimal for the supplier. The supplier has a single opportunity to offer the retailer a menu
of contracts to persuade him to change his procurement plan. A single contract specifies the retailer’s
orders at the supplier and a side payment from the supplier to the retailer. By using a large enough
side payment the supplier can convince the retailer to accept a different procurement plan. The menu
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can contain any number of contracts. However, since the retailer can reject any offered contract and has
private information on his cost structure, it is not trivial to design a menu of contracts that minimises
the supplier’s costs.
We consider the case where all cost parameters are time independent. Consequently, as we will show
in Section 2, the only relevant costs are the supplier’s setup cost of production, the retailer’s setup cost
for an order, and the holding costs for the inventory of both parties. We assume that the retailer’s
private information is either his setup cost or his holding cost, and lies in a certain interval. Thus, the
private information is single dimensional, bounded, and continuous. We also assume that the supplier
has a probability distribution for the retailer’s private information.
The supplier uses mechanism design (see Laffont and Martimort (2002)) to construct a menu of
contracts that minimises his expected costs, which requires solving a specific optimisation problem. We
call this optimisation problem the contracting problem, which can be formulated as a mixed integer linear
program with infinitely many variables and constraints. All details of the setting and the model will be
given in Section 2.
Our goals are to analyse the contracting problem to obtain a tractable formulation and to deter-
mine efficiently solvable cases. Of particular interest is whether the information asymmetry changes
the complexity class of the underlying optimisation problem. That is, if all information is shared the
corresponding contracting problem turns out to be a traditional joint lot-sizing problem, which is solv-
able in polynomial time (see Zangwill (1969)). With information asymmetry the contracting problem
is non-trivial, but can it still be solved in polynomial time? Before we state our main results for these
questions, we first discuss the related literature to position our contribution.
1.1 Related literature
At its core, the described lot-sizing contracting problem is strongly related to the two-echelon lot-sizing
problem. Also notice that the retailer’s default plan, being individually optimal, follows from solving a
single-level lot-sizing problem. Both these traditional lot-sizing problems have been analysed in detail
in the literature. We refer to Wagner and Whitin (1958) and Zangwill (1969) for solution methods. As
we will show, we need to solve several joint lot-sizing subproblems where either the number of retailer
setups or the amount of retailer inventory is fixed. In a way, this relates to a parametric analysis (see
Van Hoesel and Wagelmans (2000)) and stability regions of solutions (see Richter and Vo¨ro¨s (1989)).
However, certain properties used in the previous references do not hold in general for our subproblems.
For example, in specific cases the optimal menu of contracts contains procurement plans that do not
satisfy the so-called zero-inventory property, implying that the retailer has unnecessary inventory when
considered in isolation. More details are given in Section 3.
The lot-sizing contracting problem fits in the broader research field of the application of mechanism
design to traditional optimisation problems. We focus on literature that considers related supply chain
procurement problems with asymmetric information. See also Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Leng
and Parlar (2005) for more general references on this topic.
Perhaps one of the most fundamental researched problems is the economic order quantity (EOQ)
problem under information asymmetry. Compared to our lot-sizing setting, the EOQ problem considers
a constant demand rate over time, an infinite time horizon, and divisible products. Several variations
have been researched, such as the private information being continuous or discrete, and single- or two-
dimensional (see for example Corbett and de Groote (2000), Inderfurth et al. (2013), Kerkkamp et
al. (2018), and Pishchulov and Richter (2016)). Another setting is the newsvendor problem under
information asymmetry, which considers a single period but with uncertain demand. This problem has
been analysed in Burnetas et al. (2007), Cachon (2003), and Cakanyildirim et al. (2012) among others.
In these models a (single) order quantity describes the entire procurement plan and the total costs
of each party have closed-form expressions in terms of this order quantity. In contrast, for the lot-sizing
problem the total costs of each party cannot be expressed as (manageable) closed-form formulas. Instead,
the costs follow from solving a combinatorial optimisation problem. This requires a different solution
approach.
In Albrecht (2017) a coordination problem based on lot-sizing between a supplier and retailer is
considered. Both parties only communicate the desired or supplied order quantities, no other information
is shared. The focus lies on a heuristic coordination scheme which might lead to an optimal procurement
plan for the entire supply chain. Certain conditions are identified for which this is indeed the case. In
the proposed scheme, the retailer determines a list of individually optimal retailer plans, where each
plan has a fixed number of retailer setups. The list is then offered to the supplier, who determines his
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optimal response (a supplier plan) for each retailer plan. Finally, both parties jointly decide which of
the resulting joint procurement plans is executed. These final negotiations should also include a way
to divide the resulting profit gained from the coordination, for which several strategies are suggested
but not analysed. Similar coordination and negotiation settings are analysed in for example Buer et al.
(2013), Dudek and Stadtler (2005), and Dudek and Stadtler (2007).
The setting in Albrecht (2017) differs significantly from ours: our goal is to minimise the supplier’s
costs, not to achieve perfect supply chain coordination, and more information is available to the supplier.
However, the coordination scheme has the following similarity to our case. As we will show in Section 3,
with private setup cost it is sufficient for optimality to design a list of T plans, namely one plan for each
possible number of retailer setups. In contrast, these plans follow from joint lot-sizing problems and are
not individually optimal plans.
To our knowledge, only the works of Mobini et al. (2014) and Phouratsamay (2017) consider similar
discrete lot-sizing problems under information asymmetry. In the setting of Mobini et al. (2014) the costs
are time dependent and the retailer’s private information is discrete and multi-dimensional. Several
conditions are identified under which the retailer’s behaviour, regarding the selection of contracts, is
more structured. Furthermore, the case with private demand information is analysed. Phouratsamay
(2017) also considers the lot-sizing contracting problem with time-dependent costs and discrete private
information. Three contract variations are analysed: contracts without side payments, contracts where
the side payments can only compensate the retailer’s holding costs, and contracts with unrestricted side
payments. If all information is shared among the supplier and retailer, the variant with restricted side
payments is NP-hard and the other two are solvable in polynomial time. For the private information case,
the variant without side payments is polynomially solvable, but the complexity for the others remain
open. For all these cases a numerical study is performed, showing that using restricted side payments
performs only slightly worse than using unrestricted side payments. We complement the work of Mobini
et al. (2014) and Phouratsamay (2017) by considering continuous private information, which requires a
different solution approach.
1.2 Contribution
We present and analyse a two-echelon discrete lot-sizing problem where the retailer has single-dimensional
continuous private information. In this principal-agent contracting problem either the retailer’s setup
cost or his holding cost is private. To our knowledge, this type of problem has not been researched in
the literature, and we are the first to analyse a principal-agent contracting problem with an underlying
combinatorial structure and continuous private information. Based on a theoretical analysis, we propose
a two-stage solution approach consisting of a plan-generation stage and a plan-assignment stage. We
identify cases where these stages can be solved in polynomial time and give the corresponding algorithms.
This provides further insights into the complexity of lot-sizing models with asymmetric information.
Moreover, we observe structural differences compared to traditional lot-sizing problems due to the
information asymmetry, such as optimal menus with plans that violate the zero-inventory property.
Furthermore, the contracting problem and several of our results have an intuitive graphical interpretation,
which is also applicable to other problem settings. Therefore, we also describe a more general setting for
which the (conceptual) model, the solution approach, and certain results are applicable as well.
The remainder is organised as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the setting of our problem
and the associated optimisation model. In Section 3 we analyse this model, derive a solution approach,
and prove complexity results. The generalisability of our results is the central topic of the discussion in
Section 4, in which we also conclude our results.
2 The contracting problem
In this section we formalise the considered two-echelon lot-sizing contracting problem described in the
introduction. In Section 2.1 we specify the lot-sizing setting, the two players involved in the problem,
and their possible actions. The corresponding optimisation model is given in Section 2.2.
2.1 The setting
Our setting considers a discrete lot-sizing problem between a supplier and a retailer for a finite planning
horizon T ∈ N≥1. The retailer needs to satisfy market demand dt ∈ N>0 in each time period t ∈ T =
{1, . . . , T} in the planning horizon. We assume that the products are indivisible, leading to discrete
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demand, and that this demand is strictly positive and deterministic in each period. The strict positivity
of the demand streamlines certain results and proofs, and will be discussed in Section 4.1. The market
demand can be satisfied either from the retailer’s inventory, i.e., surplus available from the previous time
period, or directly from a retailer’s order at the supplier. In turn, the supplier satisfies the retailer’s
orders either from available inventory or by setting up a new production.
In the entire supply chain lead-times are zero, all demand or orders must be met, and back-ordering
is not allowed. Furthermore, in the first time period the starting inventory of the supplier and retailer
are assumed to be zero and the retailer must end with zero inventory after the final time period T . Thus,
to satisfy the market demand a procurement plan for the supply chain must be made. This plan specifies
for each period t ∈ T the supplier’s production quantity xSt ∈ N and the retailer’s order quantity xRt ∈ N
at the supplier. Since the demand is deterministic and there are no back-orders, these order quantities
completely determine the flow of products in the supply chain. Hence, a procurement plan prescribes
the setups, the order quantities, and the resulting inventory for the entire planning horizon.
In our setting all costs and revenues are time independent. Consequently, we can assume without
loss of generality that the variable procurement costs and the revenue from sold products are zero in the
supply chain. We will elaborate on this after giving the optimisation model. Therefore, there are two
relevant types of costs involved for the supplier and retailer, namely setup cost and holding cost. If the
retailer places an order he incurs a setup cost of f ∈ R>0 and keeping a unit of products in inventory
costs h ∈ R>0 per time period for the retailer. Similarly, for the supplier we have setup cost F ∈ R>0
and holding cost H ∈ R>0.
As mentioned in the introduction, the retailer has single-dimensional private information, i.e, either
his setup cost f or his holding cost h is private. To handle both cases, we use θ for his private cost and
call θ the retailer’s type. To be precise, if the setup cost f is private we define f(θ) = θ and h(θ) = h.
In the other case, with private holding cost h, we define f(θ) = f and h(θ) = θ. We assume that
the supplier has estimated the retailer’s private information θ to follow a strictly positive continuous
distribution ω : Θ→ R>0 on a closed interval Θ = [
¯
θ, θ¯] ⊂ R>0.
By assumption, the retailer has the market power to enforce any retailer’s procurement plan onto the
supplier. Consequently, by default the retailer orders according to his individually optimal plan, which
depends on his type. The corresponding retailer’s default costs are denoted by φ∗(θ) for type θ ∈ Θ
and follow from solving a traditional single-level lot-sizing problem. We refer to φ∗ as the retailer’s
default option, also known as his reservation level. The supplier uses mechanism-design techniques by
offering the retailer a menu of contracts to incentivise the retailer to alter his procurement plan. The
menu effectively assigns a contract to each type θ ∈ Θ, where a contract prescribes the retailer’s order
quantities xRt (θ), t ∈ T , and a side payment z(θ) ∈ R from the supplier to the retailer. However, the
retailer has the power to choose any of the offered contracts or his default option, whichever minimises
his own costs. Therefore, this menu of contracts has to be specifically designed by the supplier, as will
be made clear in the next section when discussing the optimisation model.
The overall goal of the supplier is to design a menu of contracts that minimises the supplier’s expected
net costs whilst ensuring that the retailer can satisfy the market demand. There is no restriction on the
number of contracts in the menu, but an optimal menu with fewer contracts is preferred. Finally, the
menu can be offered only once and there are no renegotiations.
2.2 The contracting model
We formulate an optimisation model to determine an optimal menu of contracts that minimises the
supplier’s expected net costs, as described in the previous section. To this end, let yRt ∈ B denote
whether the retailer has a setup (places an order) at time t ∈ T and let IRt ∈ N be the retailer’s ending
inventory at time t ∈ T . Similarly, we have the setup indicator ySt ∈ B and the ending inventory ISt ∈ N
for the supplier. Recall that xSt , x
R
t ∈ N are the order quantities and z ∈ R is the side payment. The
contracting model is defined as follows:
min
∫ θ¯
¯
θ
ω(θ)
(
F
∑
t∈T
ySt (θ) +H
∑
t∈T
ISt (θ) + z(θ)
)
dθ (1)
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subject to
IS0 (θ) = 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, (2)
ISt−1(θ) + x
S
t (θ) = I
S
t (θ) + x
R
t (θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (3)
xSt (θ) ≤MySt (θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (4)
IR0 (θ) = I
R
T (θ) = 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, (5)
IRt−1(θ) + x
R
t (θ) = I
R
t (θ) + dt, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (6)
yRt (θ) ≤ xRt (θ) ≤MyRt (θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (7)
ySt (θ), y
R
t (θ) ∈ B, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (8)
xSt (θ), x
R
t (θ), I
S
t (θ), I
R
t (θ) ∈ N, ∀ θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T , (9)
f(θ)
∑
t∈T
yRt (θˆ) + h(θ)
∑
t∈T
IRt (θˆ) ≡ φ(x(θˆ)|θ), ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ Θ, (10)
φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) ≤ φ∗(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ, (11)
φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) ≤ φ(x(θˆ)|θ)− z(θˆ), ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ Θ. (12)
Here, the objective (1) is to minimise the supplier’s expected net costs, which consists of setup and holding
costs and the side payment paid to the retailer. Constraints (2)-(9) are the lot-sizing constraints for the
procurement plan of each contract, constraints (10) are for notational convenience, and constraints (11)-
(12) are the mechanism-design constraints.
In particular, constraints (2) make sure that the supplier’s inventory at the start of the planning
horizon is zero. Constraints (3) model the supplier’s inventory balance, i.e., the flow of products on the
supplier’s level. Next, constraints (4) enforce that a setup takes place if at least one unit of products is
produced. Here, M is a suitably large number, e.g., M =
∑
t∈T dt.
Constraints (5)-(7) are similar and correspond to the retailer. Note that by assumption the supplier
can only prescribe the retailer’s order quantities xRt (θ), so he cannot force the retailer to incur the setup
cost f by using a dummy order of zero products. This is reflected in the model by yRt (θ) ≤ xRt (θ) in (7),
which is explicitly needed for correctness. We also enforce our assumption that IRT (θ) = 0 in (5). This
is in contrast to traditional lot-sizing models without information asymmetry.
Moreover, for given order quantities (xRt , t ∈ T ) the rest of the retailer’s procurement plan (yRt ,
IRt , t ∈ T ) is fixed. In other words, there is a bijection between the retailer’s order quantities and his
procurement plan. Therefore, we denote a contract by (x(θ), z(θ)), where x(θ) encodes the retailer’s
procurement plan. We omit the superscript for the retailer in x(θ) to simplify our notation.
In constraints (10) we define φ(x(θˆ)|θ) as the retailer’s lot-sizing costs when using plan x(θˆ) and
being type θ ∈ Θ. Next, constraints (11) are the Individual Rationality (IR) constraints, which imply
that for retailer type θ the contract (x(θ), z(θ)) leads to net costs that do not exceed his default costs
φ∗(θ). Constraints (12) are the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints and require for retailer type θ
that contract (x(θ), z(θ)) has the lowest net costs of all contracts. Thus, (11) and (12) ensure that the
retailer of type θ will accept his intended contract (x(θ), z(θ)).
We conclude this section with several remarks on the model related to information asymmetry. First,
notice that the supplier in fact faces a bi-level optimisation problem. In our case, the retailer’s response
to a contract can be easily incorporated by (5)-(7), leading to a single-level optimisation model. However,
care has to be taken to enforce the proper behaviour, i.e., no dummy setups and no excess supply of
products, as explained above. Second, as φ∗(θ) ≤ φ(x|θ) by definition for any feasible plan x, any
feasible contract has a non-negative side payment by (11). Finally, in the previous section we claimed
that any time-independent variable cost or revenue can be assumed to be zero. It is trivial to verify
that
∑
t∈T x
S
t (θ) =
∑
t∈T x
R
t (θ) =
∑
t∈T dt for all θ ∈ Θ in any optimal solution. Therefore, a non-zero
time-independent variable cost/revenue either leads to a constant term in the objective or cancels out in
(11) and (12). This is also the case if that cost/revenue is private information. Hence, we only need to
include setup and holding costs.
Clearly, complicating factors in solving the contracting model are the infinitely many variables and
constraints. In the next section, we describe a solution approach which leads to polynomial-time algo-
rithms in certain cases.
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3 Solution approach
To solve the contracting model introduced in Section 2.2 we propose a two-stage approach. In the first
stage, a list of procurement plans for the supply chain is constructed such that the list is sufficient for
solving the contracting problem in the second stage. Next, in the second stage, the plans are assigned
to retailer types and appropriate side payments are determined. To justify this approach, we start by
analysing the contracting model in Section 3.1. The plan assignment is discussed in Section 3.2 and the
plan generation in Section 3.3. All corresponding proofs are given in Appendix A.
3.1 Analysis
First of all, let us state some well-known properties of the retailer’s default option φ∗, i.e., it being the
lower envelope of at most T linear functions in θ ∈ Θ, see Lemma 1. The stated zero-inventory property
means that a setup only occurs if there is no inventory from the previous time period. In this case, it
refers to only the retailer’s level, i.e., yRt I
R
t−1 = 0 for all t ∈ T .
Lemma 1 (Van Hoesel and Wagelmans (2000)). The retailer’s default option φ∗(θ) is piecewise linear,
non-decreasing, concave, and continuous in the retailer type θ ∈ Θ. It consists of at most T linear
segments and the corresponding retailer’s default plans satisfy the zero-inventory property. A complete
specification of φ∗ can be determined in O(T 2) time.
We have a graphical interpretation of Lemma 1 which is also useful for the contracting model. For
any retailer plan we can plot its costs as a function of θ, see Figure 1a for a conceptual example. In
this example we assume that only the 5 shown retailer plans exist to keep the figure legible. In a real
example, there could be excessively, but still finitely, many feasible plans. The horizontal axis is the
type space which contains Θ. The vertical axis is the retailer’s total costs φ(x|θ). Each line is a retailer
plan x with the following properties. In case of private setup cost, the slope is equal to the number of
retailer setups
∑
t∈T y
R
t and the intersection with the vertical axis is the retailer’s total holding costs
h
∑
t∈T I
R
t . In case of private holding cost, the slope is the total amount of retailer inventory
∑
t∈T I
R
t
and the intersection with the vertical axis is the retailer’s total setup costs f
∑
t∈T y
R
t . In either case,
the slope implies the retailer’s private costs and the intersection with the vertical axis is equal to the
retailer’s public costs.
In Figure 1a plans I, II, and IV form the retailer’s default option φ∗ (shown in red). Plans III and V
are never optimal for the retailer. For the contracting model the optimal supplier plans are determined
for these retailer plans. If, for example, plans III and V result in very low costs for the supplier, he can
use side payments to incentivise the retailer to accept these plans instead of I, II, and IV, as shown in
blue in Figure 1b. Side payments shift the lines vertically, leading to a new lower envelope, which must
lie under φ∗ for θ ∈ Θ by constraints (11).
¯
θ θ¯
I
II
III
IV
V
II IV
θ
φ(x|θ)
(a) Without side payments the retailer accepts con-
tracts II or IV.
¯
θ θ¯
I
II
III
IV
V
III V
zIII
zV
θ
φ(x|θ)− z
(b) Using side payments to incentivise the retailer
to accept contracts III or V.
Figure 1: Conceptual graphical interpretation of the contracting model.
From the graphical interpretation it follows intuitively that the optimal menu leads to a piecewise
linear, non-decreasing, concave, and continuous function (a lower envelope) in terms of θ ∈ Θ, which
lies below φ∗ in Θ. Hence, the slopes of the segments must be non-increasing. Furthermore, if multiple
segments have the same slope, only one with the lowest supplier’s net costs is required. This implies a
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strong ordering in the slopes, i.e., either the number of retailer setups (private setup cost) or the retailer
inventory (private holding cost) is strictly decreasing. This result is formalised in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Without loss of optimality, any two distinct contracts (x(θ), z(θ)) and (x(θˆ), z(θˆ)) for some
θ < θˆ ∈ Θ in an optimal menu satisfy
∑
t∈T
yRt (θ) >
∑
t∈T
yRt (θˆ) if setup cost f is private∑
t∈T
IRt (θ) >
∑
t∈T
IRt (θˆ) if holding cost h is private
. (13)
A direct consequence of the strict ordering in Lemma 2 and the discrete nature of the involved
quantities is that offering only a limited number of contracts is sufficient for optimality for the contracting
problem. By doing so, multiple retailer types will be assigned the same contract, which is called pooling.
Moreover, it follows that this pooling occurs in a structured way: the interval [
¯
θ, θ¯] is partitioned into
subintervals and each subinterval is assigned a unique contract. This effect is again intuitively clear from
the graphical interpretation in Figure 1b. More details are provided in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. Without loss of optimality, an optimal menu partitions (pools) the retailer types into
subintervals and consists of at mostT contracts if setup cost f is private1 +∑
t∈T
(t− 1)dt contracts if holding cost h is private .
In particular, for such an optimal menu consisting of K ∈ N≥1 distinct contracts the types [
¯
θ, θ¯] are
partitioned into K closed subintervals [
¯
θk, θ¯k], k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where the k-th contract is the most
preferred contract for all types in the k-th subinterval [
¯
θk, θ¯k].
The maximum number of contracts stated in Corollary 3 is the number of feasible slopes that can be
achieved. By Lemma 2 it is sufficient for optimality to design a single plan for each feasible slope, i.e.,
for each feasible number of retailer setups
∑
t∈T y
R
t (private setup cost) or retailer inventory
∑
t∈T I
R
t
(private holding cost). It turns out that the procurement plans in an optimal menu can be determined
independently from each other, each following from a modified joint lot-sizing problem, see Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Without loss of optimality, the lot-sizing variables of a contract (x(θ), z(θ)) in an optimal
menu satisfying 
∑
t∈T
yRt (θ) = n if setup cost f is private∑
t∈T
IRt (θ) = n if holding cost h is private
(14)
are determined by solving a corresponding joint lot-sizing problem, namely minimising
∑
t∈T
(
FySt (θ) +HI
S
t (θ) + hI
R
t (θ)
)
if setup cost f is private∑
t∈T
(
FySt (θ) +HI
S
t (θ) + fy
R
t (θ)
)
if holding cost h is private
(15)
under the constraints (2)-(9) and (14).
We call the joint lot-sizing problem of Theorem 4 the n-plan generation problem. Notice that the n-
plan generation problem only includes the supplier’s setup and holding costs and the retailer’s public costs.
The retailer’s private costs are fixed by (14). We can obtain this result in the graphical interpretation
as well. Consider the situation in Figure 1a. We can ‘normalise’ all plans by shifting them downwards
so they intersect with the origin, by setting the side payment equal to the retailer’s public costs of the
plan. All plans with the same slope (see (14)) are now essentially equivalent and it is optimal to only
use the plan with the lowest supplier’s ‘normalised’ costs. That is, the plan for which (15) is minimal,
as the normalisation incorporates the retailer’s public costs into the supplier’s costs.
From the above theoretical results, we conclude that it is sufficient for optimality to solve the n-plan
generation problem for each feasible slope n and use these plans to design a menu of contracts. The
described plan generation is the first stage of our solution approach. We postpone the analysis of the
n-plan generation problem to Section 3.3. First, we continue in Section 3.2 with the second stage of the
solution approach: the plan assignment problem, where we need to assign the plans to the retailer types
by using side payments, leading to a menu of contracts.
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3.2 Plan assignment
From Section 3.1 we can assume without loss of optimality that we have a finite list of procurement
plans, obtained from the plan-generation stage. The next step is the plan assignment stage where we
need to decide which plans of the list will be incorporated into contracts and how these plans/contracts
are assigned to the retailer types. Before we state the plan assignment model in Section 3.2.2, we derive
two properties in Section 3.2.1 that will simplify the model.
3.2.1 Properties
We first introduce additional notation. Let K ∈ N≥1 be the number of plans in the considered list.
For now, assume that each plan is included into a contract. We can index and sort the contracts by
decreasing slope of the retailer plan, resulting in (xk, zk) for k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}. By Lemma 2 and
Corollary 3 an optimal menu will partition [
¯
θ, θ¯] into K subinterval [
¯
θk, θ¯k], where the k-th contract will
be assigned to types in [
¯
θk, θ¯k].
For the plan assignment, we need to take the IR and IC constraints (11)-(12) into account. These
infinitely many constraints can be made tractable by using the partition structure described above. See
Lemma 5 for the result.
Lemma 5. To determine an optimal menu with K distinct contracts (xk, zk), k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}, and
corresponding partition subintervals [
¯
θk, θ¯k], the IR and IC constraints (11)-(12) are equivalent to:
φ(x1 |¯θ)− z1 ≤ φ∗(
¯
θ),
φ(xk |¯θk)− zk ≤ φ∗(
¯
θk), ∀ k ∈ K \ {1},
φ(xK |θ¯)− zK ≤ φ∗(θ¯),
φ(xk |¯θk)− zk = φ(xk−1 |¯θk)− zk−1, ∀ k ∈ K \ {1}. (16)
Consider Lemma 5 in the graphical interpretation. The plan assignment problem essentially consists
of shifting the lines in Figure 1a vertically to construct an optimal lower envelope for domain Θ (seen
in blue in Figure 1b). From the piecewise linearity, concavity, and continuity of φ∗ and the new lower
envelope, it follows immediately that we only need to consider the IR constraints at the breakpoints.
Furthermore, (16) relates to the continuity of the constructed lower envelope.
The second property relates to redundant plans included in the list. In an optimal menu it might
be the case that not all provided plans are assigned to retailer types. Ideally, having these redundant
plans included in the list should not interfere with the optimisation process. Lemma 6 shows that this
is indeed the case: redundant plans can safely be added without affecting the optimum.
Lemma 6. Having redundant plans/contracts does not affect the plan assignment problem.
Graphically, the lines of redundant plans can/are placed tangent to the constructed lower envelope.
This does not affect the lower envelope (the optimum), but ensures feasibility according to the equivalent
IR and IC constraints stated in Lemma 5. From this point onwards, given a menu of contracts, a plan
k in the menu is called assigned if θ¯k >
¯
θk and redundant if θ¯k =
¯
θk.
3.2.2 The plan assignment model
We can now formulate the plan assignment model. To do so in a unified way for both cases of private
information, we introduce new notation for the supplier’s lot-sizing costs, the retailer’s public lot-sizing
costs, and the slope corresponding to the private information. For a procurement plan x the correspond-
ing supplier’s costs is
C =
∑
t∈T
(
FySt +HI
S
t
)
.
If setup cost f is private, we define
cpub = h
∑
t∈T
IRt , n =
∑
t∈T
yRt .
Otherwise, if holding cost h is private, we have
cpub = f
∑
t∈T
yRt , n =
∑
t∈T
IRt .
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Hence, by definition, we have φ(xk|θ) = cpubk +nkθ for k ∈ K and θ ∈ Θ. Note that in the plan-assignment
stage Ck, c
pub
k , and nk are all known parameters and follow from the provided list of plans. It is essential
that the plans are sorted such that nk > nk+1 for all k ∈ K to ensure that the model is in line with
Lemma 2.
The plan assignment model is given by:
min
∑
k∈K
(∫ θ¯k
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ
)
(Ck + zk) (17)
subject to
cpub1 + n1¯
θ − z1 ≤ φ∗(
¯
θ), (18)
cpubk + nk¯
θk − zk ≤ φ∗(
¯
θk), ∀ k ∈ K \ {1}, (19)
cpubK + nK θ¯ − zK ≤ φ∗(θ¯), (20)
cpubk−1 − cpubk + (nk−1 − nk)¯θk = zk−1 − zk, ∀ k ∈ K \ {1} (21)
¯
θ1 =
¯
θ, (22)
¯
θk ≤ θ¯k, ∀ k ∈ K, (23)
θ¯k =
¯
θk+1, ∀ k ∈ K \ {K}, (24)
θ¯K = θ¯. (25)
Here, (18)-(20) are the IR constraints and (21) the IC constraints as described in Lemma 5. The
constraints (22)-(25) model the partition of [
¯
θ, θ¯] and the corresponding assignment of contracts to
subintervals as stated in Corollary 3. Consequently, the integral in the objective (17) is the probability
that the retailer accepts contract (xk, zk).
We emphasize again that the model is only correct if nk > nk+1 for all k ∈ K (by Lemma 2). Also,
by Lemma 6 redundant plans/contracts can be added without affecting the optimum, provided that the
ordering in nk is maintained. Moreover, note that φ
∗(
¯
θk) in (19) can be modelled with at most T linear
constraints for each k ∈ K (see Lemma 1). Namely, replace (19) by
cpubk + nk¯
θk − zk ≤ c∗l + n∗l¯θk, ∀ l ∈ L, k ∈ K \ {1},
where the θ 7→ c∗l + n∗l θ, l ∈ L (|L| ≤ T ), correspond to the retailer’s default plans and whose lower
envelope is φ∗. Finally, by combining (21) the IC constraints imply for k ∈ K that
zk = z1 + c
pub
k − cpub1 −
k∑
i=2
(ni−1 − ni)
¯
θi.
Substituting this expression in the objective function, results in a separable non-linear objective:
z1 − cpub1 +
∑
k∈K
(∫ θ¯k
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ
)(
Ck + c
pub
k −
k∑
i=2
(ni−1 − ni)
¯
θi
)
= z1 − cpub1 +
∑
k∈K
(∫ θ¯k
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ
)(
Ck + c
pub
k
)
−
K∑
k=2
(∫ θ¯
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ
)
(nk−1 − nk)
¯
θk. (26)
Thus, the plan assignment model has a formulation with linear constraints and a non-linear separable
objective function. In general, such optimisation models are difficult to solve to optimality, but several
(heuristic) solution approaches have been designed (see for example Bradley et al. (1977), Byrd et al.
(2003), and Kolda et al. (2007)).
If the retailer type distribution ω is uniform, the plan assignment model has a hidden convexity.
The standard formulation is still non-convex, but by using the reformulated objective function (26) we
obtain a linearly-constrained convex-quadratic model. It is well known that these models can be solved
efficiently (see Ye and Tse (1989)). This result is captured in Theorem 7 and its proof contains the
details of the convex formulation.
Theorem 7. If ω is a uniform distribution, then the plan assignment model can be formulated as
a linearly-constrained convex-quadratic model. It can be solved in polynomial time in the number of
contracts K by interior-point methods.
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3.3 Plan generation
In the plan-generation stage we need to solve several joint lot-sizing problems as described in Theorem 4.
In Section 3.3.1 we first give properties of this problem that are common for the two private information
cases. Then we focus on each case separately: private setup cost in Section 3.3.2 and private holding
cost in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Common properties
In a standard joint lot-sizing problem, i.e., without constraint (14), it is well known that there exists
an optimal solution that satisfies the zero-inventory property. Such an optimal solution can be found
in polynomial time using dynamic programming by its decomposition into independent subplans. In
contrast, for the n-plan generation problem the optimal solution might not satisfy the zero-inventory
property, as we will show later. However, the zero-inventory property always holds for the supplier’s
lot-sizing plan, see Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. For an optimal solution for the n-plan generation problem, the supplier’s lot-sizing plan must
satisfy the zero-inventory property.
Another property in certain joint lot-sizing problems is that the joint plan is nested. This means that
a supplier setup implies a retailer setup in the same time period: ySt = 1 implies y
R
t = 1 for t ∈ T . This
property holds for the n-plan generation problem, as shown in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. For an optimal solution for the n-plan generation problem, the joint lot-sizing plan must be
nested.
The properties in Lemmas 8 and 9 imply that the main focus of the remaining analysis is the retailer’s
plan. In particular, how does the constraint on either the retailer setups or the retailer inventory affect
the solution structure? We continue with analysing the n-plan generation problem separately for the
two private information cases.
3.3.2 Private setup cost
In this section we prove that for private setup cost the plan generation problem can be solved in poly-
nomial time by a dynamic-programming algorithm. An essential part of this algorithm is that we can
decompose an optimal solution of the n-plan generation into independent subplans. An independent
subplan, denoted by (
¯
t, t¯, n), only considers the subproblem with time periods {¯t, . . . , t¯} ⊆ T . It has a
single supplier setup, in the initial time period
¯
t, from which exactly all demand
∑t¯
t=
¯
t dt is satisfied.
Also, there is no inventory transferred to/from time periods not belonging to the subproblem. Finally,
the subplan must have exactly n retailer setups. The decomposable structure into independent subplans
is proven in Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. Any optimal solution of the n-plan generation problem can be decomposed into independent
subplans.
The result of Lemma 10 implies that the optimal solution of the n-plan generation problem can
be found by solving several appropriately chosen subproblems independently. In order to solve such a
subproblem we need to determine the structure of its optimal solutions. The next result, Lemma 11,
shows that the structure depends on whether H ≤ h or H > h.
Lemma 11. Consider an optimal independent subplan prescribing exactly n retailer setups. If H ≤ h
then this subplan satisfies the zero-inventory property (without loss of optimality if H = h). If H > h
then this subplan is unique: the retailer has setups only in the first n periods, where the post-initial orders
are 1 unit of supply. In this case, the retailer’s plan might not satisfy the zero-inventory property.
Lemma 11 states that if H ≤ h the optimal solution satisfies the zero-inventory property. Hence,
this case is similar to traditional joint lot-sizing problems and can be solved by dynamic programming.
However, if H > h there is a unique and straightforward optimal solution, which might violate the zero-
inventory property. See Figure 2 for an example with T = 5 and n = 3. This figure is a network flow
graph, where the arrows indicate strictly positive flow of products through the supply chain. That is, a
vertical arrow is a setup and a horizontal arrow implies having inventory at that time period. The upper
layer is the supplier’s lot-sizing plan and the lower layer the retailer’s plan. At the bottom the time
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periods are displayed. In Appendix B we give an example where the (unique) optimal menu contains
such a contract that violates the zero-inventory property.
Supplier
Retailer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2
1
1
1
Figure 2: The unique optimal subplan in the case of private setup cost, H > h, T = 5, and n = 3.
From Lemmas 10 and 11 the dynamic-programming approach should be clear. First, solve all related
independent subproblems and then use these optimal subplans to construct an optimal solution for the
n-plan generation problem by dynamic programming. Since we need to solve all n-plan generation
problems (n ∈ {1, . . . , T}) we can reuse many computations. The approach is similar to the dynamic-
programming algorithm in Zangwill (1969), but we need to fix the number of retailer setups and take the
two cases H ≤ h and H > h into account. Theorem 12 concludes these insights and its proof contains
the specification of the dynamic-programming algorithm.
Theorem 12. Solving all n-plan generation problems can be done in O(T 4) time by dynamic program-
ming.
To conclude the private setup cost case, we can use the dynamic-programming algorithm stated in
the proof of Theorem 12 to construct a list of procurement plans that is sufficient for optimality for the
contracting problem. This list can then be used in the plan-assignment stage to determine the optimal
allocation of contracts to the retailer types and solve the contracting problem. In particular, if ω is a
uniform distribution, the entire contracting problem can be solved to optimality in polynomial time by
Theorems 7 and 12. We state this result in the next theorem.
Theorem 13. If ω is a uniform distribution, then the contracting problem can be solved in polynomial
time.
3.3.3 Private holding cost
The case that the holding cost is private information appears to be more complicated than having private
setup cost. In particular, a similar result as Lemma 10 does not hold for the n-plan generation problem
in general. For example, certain amounts of retailer inventory (n values) cannot be achieved with plans
that satisfy the zero-inventory property. Furthermore, if the supplier’s setup cost F is appropriately
chosen, then it would be optimal to have several supplier setups in such a (sub)plan, disproving that the
decomposition structure holds in general. The smallest example is T = 2, d1 = 1, d2 = 2, F < H, and
the optimal plan for n = 1, see Figure 3c.
(1) (2)
3
3
2
(a) n = 2.
(1) (2)
3
2
1
1
1
(b) n = 1, F ≥ H.
(1) (2)
2
2
1
1
1
(c) n = 1, F < H.
(1) (2)
3
1
2
2
(d) n = 0, F ≥ 2H.
(1) (2)
1
1
2
2
(e) n = 0, F < 2H.
Figure 3: The optimal solutions for the n-plan generation problems in the case of private holding cost
with T = 2, d1 = 1, and d2 = 2.
Moreover, we potentially need to solve pseudo-polynomially many n-plan generation problems by
Corollary 3. We have not been able to determine an efficient combinatorial algorithm to solve all n-
plan generation problems. However, there seems to be a redundancy in the complete list of plans. For
example, the plans in Figures 3c and 3e lead to the same supplier’s lot-sizing costs, but the retailer’s
lot-sizing costs are lower for the plan for n = 0 (Figure 3e). In order words, the plan of Figure 3c has a
form of inefficiency. Unfortunately, it is not directly clear whether we can omit this plan, since the side
payments need to be taken into account.
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If we assume a uniform distribution for the retailer’s type, then the following lemma provides further
indications that certain plans are redundant. Lemma 14 states a necessary condition for assigning a plan
with a slope that does not occur in φ∗.
Lemma 14. Assume that ω is a uniform distribution. Consider k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1} such that φ∗ has no
slopes n∗ with nk−1 > n∗ > nk+1. If plan k is assigned, i.e., θ¯k >
¯
θk, then the following must hold:
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck−1 + cpubk−1)
nk−1 − nk +
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck+1 + cpubk+1)
nk − nk+1 < 0. (27)
In particular, if we consider all possible plans (nk+1 = nk − 1), Lemma 14 implies that an assigned
plan k ∈ K such that nk is not a slope of φ∗ must satisfy
2(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck−1 + cpubk−1)− (Ck+1 + cpubk+1) < 0.
We can apply this to the example in Figure 3. Realise that n = 1 is not a slope of φ∗. The condition of
Lemma 14 for n = 1 is
0 > 2(F + min{F,H}+ 2f)− (F + f)− (F + min{F, 2H}+ 2f)
= f + 2 min{F,H} −min{F, 2H} ≥ f > 0.
This is a contradiction. Hence, the plan for n = 1 is never assigned.
Under the additional assumption that the supplier’s setup cost F is high enough to prevent any
additional supplier setups, we can solve the plan generation problem in polynomial time. In this case,
all optimal plans have exactly a single supplier setup. The idea is to use Lemma 14 to exclude many
plans and show that the remaining plans can be determined efficiently. Of particular interest are so-called
extreme plans. We call a plan m-extreme if it has minimal retailer inventory with m retailer setups, where
m ∈ {1, . . . , T}. It is trivial that these extreme plans must satisfy the zero-inventory property. Note
that all default plans of φ∗ are extreme plans. Lemma 15 shows that under the mentioned assumptions
T extreme plans are sufficient for optimality for the contracting problem.
Lemma 15. Assume that ω is a uniform distribution and F > H maxτ∈T {(τ − 1)
∑T
t=τ dt}. A list
consisting of an m-extreme plan for each m ∈ {1, . . . , T} is sufficient for optimality for the contracting
problem.
Under the assumptions of Lemma 15, all m-extreme plans for fixed m have the same supplier’s costs
and retailer’s public costs. Consequently, it is sufficient to determine any m-extreme plan. In this case,
we can solve the (entire) plan generation problem by determining these T extreme plans, which can be
done by dynamic programming. The result is a polynomial-time algorithm for the plan generation under
the specified assumptions, see Lemma 16.
Lemma 16. Assume that ω is a uniform distribution and F > H maxτ∈T {(τ − 1)
∑T
t=τ dt}. Gener-
ating plans sufficient for optimality for the contracting problem can be done in O(T 3) time by dynamic
programming.
By combining Theorem 7 and Lemmas 15 and 16, we conclude that under the stated conditions the
contracting problem can be solved in polynomial time, see Corollary 17.
Corollary 17. If ω is a uniform distribution and F > H maxτ∈T {(τ −1)
∑T
t=τ dt}, then the contracting
problem can be solved in polynomial time.
From numerical experiments we have indications that similar results hold without the condition on
the supplier’s setup cost F . Furthermore, we have the following property. Consider a list containing the
plans for all slopes of φ∗. Now keep all side payments fixed and focus on the plans with slopes different
from φ∗. These other plans share a special property: they can always be removed from a feasible menu
to obtain a new feasible menu (without changing the side payments). This property is obvious from the
graphical interpretation and can potentially be used to exclude plans from consideration. To conclude,
we conjecture that plans with the same slopes as φ∗ are essential for optimality for the contracting
problem. However, more research needs to be done for a formal proof and for other distributions for ω.
4 Discussion and conclusion
The modelling concept and solution approach is applicable to a broader range of problems. In this section,
we discuss the generalisability of our results, propose research directions, and conclude our findings.
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4.1 Demand assumption
One of our assumptions is that the demand in each period is strictly positive. This is not without loss
of generality, especially due to the time-independent holding costs. We will discuss the consequences if
demand can be zero.
First, we often use that the number of retailer setups lies between 1 and T . Instead, there is a
maximum feasible number of retailer setups 1 ≤ K ≤ T . This has no significant impact on the results.
Second, the dynamic-programming algorithms for both plan generation problems need to be adjusted
slightly to prevent dummy retailer setups. Consequently, fewer options need to be considered during the
algorithm, so the complexity results still hold.
Only our results for the plan generation for private setup cost are significantly affected. In the proofs
of Lemmas 10 and 11 we have explicitly mentioned where we use that demand is strictly positive. There
is a very specific case for which the two stated proofs do not hold if demand can be zero: there needs to be
a substructure that violates the zero-inventory property where this retailer inventory cannot be decreased
without invalidating a retailer setup. All details are provided in Appendix C, which we summarise here.
A common assumption for lot-sizing problems is that value is added to the product as it moves
downstream in the supply chain, increasing the holding cost. In other words, H ≤ h holds. Another
interpretation is that the supplier benefits from economies of scale to have less holding costs. In Ap-
pendix C.1 we prove for the case H ≤ h that without loss of optimality a plan is assigned in an optimal
menu only if it satisfies the zero-inventory property. We conclude that, when demand is non-negative
and H ≤ h, the plan generation problem is solvable in O(T 4) time by dynamic programming.
The other case, H > h, can be analysed using techniques similar to those in our proofs. The
(unique) optimal n-plan can be non-decomposable, as shown in Appendix C.2. However, we show that
an optimal plan consists of substructures similar to Figure 2. That is, the solution is fixed when we
know the supplier setups and how many retailer setups occur in between supplier setups. This allows
for a dedicated dynamic-programming algorithm with O(T 5) running time, which can potentially be
improved.
We conclude that our results are still valid when demand is non-negative, albeit that some modifica-
tions are needed.
4.2 Generalisability
For several of our results we did not use any property of the lot-sizing problem, implying that these
results are also valid for other problems. Here, we discuss the generalisability of our approach. We still
refer to the two involved parties by the supplier and the retailer.
The more general setting is as follows. Given the decision variables (the plan) of the supplier, the
retailer needs to solve a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem to determine his optimal
plan, and vice versa. Both the supplier and the retailer want to minimise costs as their objective. We
assume that for any retailer plan there exists a feasible supplier plan, in order to have a well-defined
default option.
The retailer has single-dimensional private information θ ∈ [
¯
θ, θ¯] = Θ ⊆ R, which must only affect
his objective value (his costs). Let x denote all decision variables from the supplier and the retailer. The
retailer’s costs for type θ ∈ Θ are
φ(x|θ) = (a>x+ a0)θ + (b>x+ b0),
for given vectors a and b, and scalars a0 and b0. Hence, we have public costs c
pub = b>x+ b0 and slope
n = a>x + a0. We assume that this slope a>x + a0 only takes on finitely many values over all feasible
plans x, which is essential. Consequently, the retailer’s default option φ∗ is the lower envelope of finitely
many linear functions.
Under the described setting and assumptions, we can apply the same two-stage solution approach
consisting of a plan-generation stage and a plan-assignment stage. In particular, all results related to
the graphical interpretation and the plan assignment are valid, since these are independent of the lot-
sizing setting. The main difference in the difficulty in solving the contracting problem lies in the plan
generation. If the bi-level optimisation problem with the additional constraint that (a>x + a0) = n
for some slope n can be solved by a single-level MILP problem, then general MILP solvers can be used.
Whether polynomial-time algorithms exist highly depends on the underlying optimisation problem. Also,
if the number of plans to generate is high, it might be useful to use heuristics instead, which we will
discuss below.
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To conclude the generalisability, we provide the details on which results are still valid. First, since
the default option φ∗ is the lower envelope of finitely many linear functions, equivalent properties as
in Lemma 1 hold (except for the complexity result). By trivially modifying the cost functions in our
proofs, we obtain the following similar results. As in Lemma 2, the slopes of the assigned plans must be
strictly decreasing. By the finitely many possible slopes, we get a bound on the number of contracts and
properties similar to Corollary 3. In the equivalent of Theorem 4, the slope a>x + a0 must be fixed to
n and the joint optimisation problem minimises the sum of the supplier’s costs and the retailer’s public
costs b>x + b0. Regarding the plan assignment, Lemmas 5, 6, and 14, and Theorem 7 are valid, since
they do not use any lot-sizing properties. The other results concern the plan generation and are specific
to the lot-sizing problem.
4.3 Heuristics
Our analysis provides several research directions for heuristics. First of all, the plan generation can
be restricted to (potentially suboptimal) plans that can be constructed efficiently, e.g., lot-sizing plans
satisfying the zero-inventory property. Also, we can generate plans only for slopes with intuitive inter-
pretations. For example, only plans with slopes that appear in φ∗ or in the optima of the unrestricted
traditional joint lot-sizing problem, when a sensitivity analysis is performed on the private cost param-
eter.
Second, by rescaling the side payment zk as z˜k = zk − cpubk , the constraints of the plan assignment
problem only depend on the slopes of the included plans. This leads the following idea. First, add a
place-holder plan for each possible slope. Second, determine lower bounds on the joint costs Ck + c
pub
k
for each k ∈ K. These costs appear in the objective after rescaling the side payment. This results in
a relaxation for the contracting problem. Then, we determine the exact joint costs for (a subset of)
the place-holder plans assigned in the optimum of the relaxation. If we calculate the joint costs of all
assigned plans, then we obtain an upper bound. By repeating this process, we get better lower and upper
bounds, and a solution approach.
Third, we can design an iterative heuristic as follows. If we fix the number of contracts and their
assignment to retailer types, then the resulting optimisation model is a mixed integer linear program.
This model is given in Appendix D. For a given partition, we solve this model to obtain procurement
plans. Then, solve the plan assignment model for these plans, resulting in a new partition. Switching
between these models leads to an iterative heuristic.
4.4 Concluding remarks
If all information is shared in the supply chain, then it is trivial to show that the supplier’s contracting
problem can be solved by a single joint lot-sizing problem. Namely, compared to the model with informa-
tion asymmetry in Section 2.2, there is only a single type, a single IR constraint, and no IC constraints.
In any optimal solution the IR constraint binds, i.e., z = φ(x) − φ∗, where we omit the single type.
Substituting this in the objective function results in a traditional joint lot-sizing problem that minimises
the sum of the supplier’s costs and all retailer’s costs. As discussed before, this problem can be solved
in polynomial time.
Our analysis and obtained results show that information asymmetry does not necessarily change the
complexity class of the underlying optimisation problem. That is, we have identified cases for which we
can solve the contracting problem under information asymmetry in polynomial time. However, clearly
it is more complicated to determine the optimal solution. Not only do we need to solve multiple joint
lot-sizing problems to generate a sufficient list of plans, we also need to solve the assignment model.
Furthermore, the interdependence between the contracts through the side payments results in offering
atypical procurement plans. For example, plans that do no satisfy the zero-inventory property or that
are not decomposable into independent subproblems.
Although the plan generation for private setup cost can be solved in polynomial time for any instance,
further research might narrow down which n-plans are sufficient for optimality for the contracting prob-
lem. For the case of private holding cost more research is needed to prove polynomial-time complexity
under less restrictive assumptions (if valid at all). Finally, the above described generalisability provides
research directions to other, more general, problem settings.
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A Proofs of Section 3
This appendix contains all proofs of Section 3. Note that many results also have an intuitive graphical
interpretation for which we refer to the main text.
A.1 Proofs of Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 1. The default option φ∗ follows from the single-level lot-sizing problem on the retailer’s
level. It is trivial that there are finitely many feasible procurement plans and each feasible plan is linear
and non-decreasing in θ. By definition, φ∗ is the point-wise minimum (the lower envelope) of these
finitely many linear functions. Only the plans that for a given number of setups (ranging from 1 to T )
minimise the retailer’s holding costs can be minimisers and form the lower envelope. Consequently, these
plans must satisfy the zero-inventory property. This proves the stated properties of φ∗. Finally, φ∗ can
be determined efficiently in O(T 2) time by using the method described in Van Hoesel and Wagelmans
(2000).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, realise that by definition we have
φ(x(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θˆ)|θ) + φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ)− φ(x(θ)|θˆ) = (f(θ)− f(θˆ))
(∑
t∈T
yRt (θ)−
∑
t∈T
yRt (θˆ)
)
+ (h(θ)− h(θˆ))
(∑
t∈T
IRt (θ)−
∑
t∈T
IRt (θˆ)
)
. (28)
Hence, if 
∑
t∈T
yRt (θ) =
∑
t∈T
yRt (θˆ) if setup cost f is private∑
t∈T
IRt (θ) =
∑
t∈T
IRt (θˆ) if holding cost h is private
(29)
then the right-hand side of (28) is equal to zero and
φ(x(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θˆ)|θ) = φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ).
Second, the IC conditions state
φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) ≤ φ(x(θˆ)|θ)− z(θˆ), φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ)− z(θˆ) ≤ φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− z(θ),
implying that
φ(x(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θˆ)|θ) ≤ z(θ)− z(θˆ) ≤ φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ). (30)
So if (29) is true, then (30) holds with equalities, resulting in
φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) = φ(x(θˆ)|θ)− z(θˆ), φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ)− z(θˆ) = φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− z(θ).
In other words, both types θ and θˆ are indifferent to each other’s contracts and these contracts can be
interchanged without affecting feasibility.
Now consider an optimal menu of contracts. If (29) holds for types θ and θˆ, then assigning both
types either contract (x(θ), z(θ)) or (x(θˆ), z(θˆ)) is feasible as shown above. Assigning the contract that
leads to the lowest supplier’s net costs cannot result in a worse objective value, i.e., the new menu must
be optimal as well. By repeating this argument, we conclude that without loss of optimality distinct
contracts do not satisfy (29).
Finally, from (30) it follows that (28) must be non-positive. For types θ < θˆ with distinct contracts
we have either f(θ) < f(θˆ) or h(θ) < h(θˆ), depending on which cost parameter is private. Furthermore,
with the above insight (28) must be strictly negative (without loss of optimality). Thus, (13) holds
without loss of optimality.
Proof of Corollary 3. By Lemma 2 we can bound the number of distinct contracts. First, the total
number of retailer setups lies between 1 and T . Since dt > 0 for all t ∈ T , all numbers 1, . . . , T of
retailer setups are feasible. Second, the total retailer inventory lies between 0 (use the maximum number
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of setups) and
∑
t∈T (t − 1)dt (use one setup). All discrete intermediate values are also feasible by
appropriately delaying parts of the orders (starting with a single setup). Here, we use our assumption
that the products are indivisible, i.e., the retailer order quantities must be discrete. Consequently, by
the finite bounds given above and the discrete nature, Lemma 2 implies that there are only finitely many
contracts in an optimal menu (without loss of optimality). Hence, retailer types must be pooled, i.e.,
some are offered the same contract.
The partitioning of the retailer types follows trivially from the ordering implied by (13). Only the
technicality that we can use closed subintervals remains to be shown. Consider the case that the k-th
contract (xk, zk) is the most preferred contract for all types (
¯
θk, θ¯k], but not for type
¯
θk. Instead, type
¯
θk strictly prefers the l-th contract (xl, zl):
φ(xl |¯θk)− zl < φ(xk |¯θk)− zk.
However, we also have
φ(xk|θk)− zk ≤ φ(xl|θk)− zl ∀ θk ∈ (
¯
θk, θ¯k]
=⇒ φ(xk |¯θk)− φ(xl |¯θk) = lim
θk→
¯
θk
{φ(xk|θk)− φ(xl|θk)} ≤ zk − zl.
Here, the continuity of the limit follows from the fact that φ(xk|θk)− φ(xl|θk) is continuous in θk. The
result contradicts that
¯
θk strictly prefers the l-th contract. Similar arguments hold for the other cases.
Thus, each subinterval is closed.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider a feasible menu and any of its contracts (x(θ), z(θ)). Modify the lot-sizing
variables of contract (x(θ), z(θ)), resulting in x¯(θ), in any way such that it is a feasible lot-sizing plan
satisfying (2)-(9) and (14). Adjust the side payment to z¯(θ) to compensate for the change in costs for
type θ:
z¯(θ) = z(θ) + φ(x¯(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θ)|θ).
By construction, we have
φ(x¯(θ)|θ)− z¯(θ) = φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) ≤ φ∗(θ),
φ(x¯(θ)|θ)− z¯(θ) = φ(x(θ)|θ)− z(θ) ≤ φ(x(θˆ)|θ)− z(θˆ), ∀ θˆ ∈ Θ.
Furthermore, for θˆ ∈ Θ we get
φ(x¯(θ)|θˆ)− z¯(θ) = φ(x¯(θ)|θˆ)− φ(x¯(θ)|θ) + φ(x(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θ)|θˆ) + φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− z(θ)
= (f(θˆ)− f(θ))
(∑
t∈T
y¯Rt (θ)−
∑
t∈T
yRt (θ)
)
+ (h(θˆ)− h(θ))
(∑
t∈T
I¯Rt (θ)−
∑
t∈T
IRt (θ)
)
+ φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− z(θ)
= φ(x(θ)|θˆ)− z(θ) ≥ φ(x(θˆ)|θˆ)− z(θˆ).
Here, the last equality holds since both plans satisfy (14) and the inequality follows from the IC con-
straints. To conclude, the menu with the modified contract is feasible.
Finally, consider an optimal menu. We can modify each contract sequentially as described above,
where the corresponding term in the objective is∑
t∈T
(
F y¯St (θ) +HI¯
S
t (θ)
)
+ z¯(θ) =
∑
t∈T
(
F y¯St (θ) +HI¯
S
t (θ)
)
+ z(θ) + φ(x¯(θ)|θ)− φ(x(θ)|θ),
where z(θ) and φ(x(θ)|θ) are now constants. Furthermore, in
φ(x¯(θ)|θ) = f(θ)
∑
t∈T
y¯Rt (θ) + h(θ)
∑
t∈T
I¯Rt (θ)
one of these terms is constant (equal to n times the retailer’s type) by (14) and the other term does not
depend on the retailer’s type. The result now follows.
18
R.B.O. Kerkkamp & W. van den Heuvel & A.P.M. Wagelmans Report EI2018-17
A.2 Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 5. For k ∈ K the IR and IC constraints must hold for all types θk ∈ [
¯
θk, θ¯k] with respect
to contract (xk, zk). First, we consider the IC constraints. For k ∈ K\{1} two (adjacent) IC constraints
state
φ(xk |¯θk)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk) ≤ zk − zk−1 ≤ φ(xk|θ¯k−1)− φ(xk−1|θ¯k−1).
Since θ¯k−1 =
¯
θk, equality holds throughout and we obtain
zk − zk−1 = φ(xk |¯θk)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk). (31)
This shows necessity of (31) and we continue with proving its sufficiency. We denote the lot-sizing
variables of retailer plan xi by y
R(i)
t and I
R(i)
t . For l < k we have
zk − zl =
k∑
i=l+1
(zi − zi−1) (31)=
k∑
i=l+1
(φ(xi |¯θi)− φ(xi−1 |¯θi))
=
k∑
i=l+1
(
f(
¯
θi)
(∑
t∈T
y
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
y
R(i−1)
t
)
+ h(
¯
θi)
(∑
t∈T
I
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
I
R(i−1)
t
))
(13)
≤
k∑
i=l+1
(
f(θl)
(∑
t∈T
y
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
y
R(i−1)
t
)
+ h(θl)
(∑
t∈T
I
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
I
R(i−1)
t
))
= φ(xk|θl)− φ(xl|θl),
for any θl ∈ [
¯
θl, θ¯l]. Likewise, for l > k we get
zk − zl = −
l∑
i=k+1
(zi − zi−1) (31)= −
l∑
i=k+1
(φ(xi |¯θi)− φ(xi−1 |¯θi))
= −
l∑
i=k+1
(
f(
¯
θi)
(∑
t∈T
y
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
y
R(i−1)
t
)
+ h(
¯
θi)
(∑
t∈T
I
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
I
R(i−1)
t
))
(13)
≤ −
l∑
i=k+1
(
f(θl)
(∑
t∈T
y
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
y
R(i−1)
t
)
+ h(θl)
(∑
t∈T
I
R(i)
t −
∑
t∈T
I
R(i−1)
t
))
= φ(xk|θl)− φ(xl|θl),
for any θl ∈ [
¯
θl, θ¯l]. Thus, all IC constraints are implied by (31).
Second, the IR constraints for k ∈ K are
φ(xk|θk)− zk ≤ φ∗(θk) ∀ θk ∈ [
¯
θk, θ¯k]
⇐⇒ sup{φ(xk|θk)− φ∗(θk) : θk ∈ [
¯
θk, θ¯k]} ≤ zk.
Since φ∗(θk) is concave by Lemma 1 and φ(xk|θk) is linear in θk, the difference φ(xk|θk) − φ∗(θk) is a
convex function in θk. The stated supremum is therefore attained at one of the border points
¯
θk or θ¯k
and the other IR constraints are redundant. In fact, more IR constraints are redundant, provided that
the IC constraints hold. For k ∈ K \ {K} we have
φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− zk+1 (31)= φ(xk |¯θk+1)− zk = φ(xk|θ¯k)− zk.
This implies that we only need one of the IR constraints corresponding to types θ¯k and
¯
θk+1.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose
¯
θk = θ¯k, i.e., the k-th contract is effectively not assigned and is redundant.
First, we consider the IC constraints. From (16) we have
zk+1 − zk = φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− φ(xk |¯θk+1),
zk − zk−1 = φ(xk |¯θk)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk).
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Adding both equalities and using
¯
θk = θ¯k =
¯
θk+1 results in
zk+1 − zk−1 = φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− φ(xk |¯θk+1) + φ(xk |¯θk)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk)
= φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− φ(xk |¯θk+1) + φ(xk |¯θk+1)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk+1)
= φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− φ(xk−1 |¯θk+1).
This is the IC constraint if we would omit the redundant k-th contract from the model.
Second, consider the IR constraints. If k ∈ K \ {K} we have
φ(xk |¯θk)− zk = φ(xk|θ¯k)− zk = φ(xk |¯θk+1)− zk (16)= φ(xk+1 |¯θk+1)− zk+1.
Thus, the corresponding IR constraints are implied by others and have no effect. Similarly, if k = K it
holds that
φ(xK |θ¯K)− zK = φ(xK |¯θK)− zK = φ(xK |θ¯K−1)− zK (16)= φ(xK−1|θ¯K−1)− zK−1.
Notice that this leads exactly to the second IR constraint required for type K − 1 if we would omit the
K-th contract from the model. We conclude that the redundant contract has no effect on the feasible
region.
Finally, the probability that the k-th contract is selected by the retailer is
∫ θ¯k
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ. If
¯
θk = θ¯k
then this probability is zero. Furthermore, other contracts are unaffected as argued above. Therefore,
such redundant contracts do not affect the optimisation problem.
Proof of Theorem 7. First, define θ¯0 =
¯
θ for notational convenience. Since ω is a uniform distribution,
the objective function in (17) becomes
∑
k∈K
θ¯k − θ¯k−1
θ¯ −
¯
θ
(Ck + zk) =
K−1∑
k=1
(Ck − Ck+1 + zk − zk+1)θ¯k
θ¯ −
¯
θ
+
(CK + zK)θ¯ − (C1 + z1)
¯
θ
θ¯ −
¯
θ
.
We can use (21) to get
(Ck − Ck+1 + zk − zk+1)θ¯k =
(
Ck − Ck+1 + cpubk − cpubk+1 + (nk − nk+1)¯θk+1
)
θ¯k
= (nk − nk+1)θ¯2k +
(
Ck + c
pub
k − Ck+1 − cpubk+1
)
θ¯k.
Furthermore, we can repeatedly use (21) to obtain
zk = z1 +
k∑
i=2
(
cpubi − cpubi−1 − (ni−1 − ni)¯θi
)
= z1 + c
pub
k − cpub1 −
k∑
i=2
(ni−1 − ni)
¯
θi
= z1 + c
pub
k − cpub1 −
k−1∑
i=1
(ni − ni+1)θ¯i. (32)
Combining all results and substituting zK , leads to the objective function
z1 − cpub1 +
(CK + c
pub
K )θ¯ − (C1 + cpub1 )¯θ
θ¯ −
¯
θ
+
K−1∑
k=1
(nk − nk+1)θ¯2k +
(
Ck + c
pub
k − Ck+1 − cpubk+1 − (nk − nk+1)θ¯
)
θ¯k
θ¯ −
¯
θ
. (33)
This objective is convex quadratic, as nk > nk+1 holds.
After eliminating unnecessary variables and using (32), the quadratic formulation is to minimise (33)
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subject to
n1
¯
θ + cpub1 − z1 ≤ φ∗(¯θ), [λ0]
nkθ¯k +
k−1∑
i=1
(ni − ni+1)θ¯i + cpub1 − z1 ≤ φ∗(θ¯k), ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, [λk]
nK θ¯ +
K−1∑
i=1
(ni − ni+1)θ¯i + cpub1 − z1 ≤ φ∗(θ¯), [λK ]
¯
θ − θ¯1 ≤ 0, [µ0,1]
θ¯k − θ¯k+1 ≤ 0, ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 2}, [µk,k+1]
θ¯K−1 − θ¯ ≤ 0. [µK−1,K ]
Note that we do not need the IC constraints in the model any more. Also, the IR constraints have been
rewritten by using
nk
¯
θk +
k−1∑
i=1
(ni − ni+1)θ¯i = nk−1θ¯k−1 +
k−2∑
i=1
(ni − ni+1)θ¯i.
Finally, the default values φ∗(θ¯k) can each be modelled using at most T linear constraints, as shown in
Section 3.2.2.
Thus, if ω is a uniform distribution, then the plan assignment model can be formulated as a linearly-
constrained convex-quadratic model with (K − 1) + 1 continuous variables and 2 + (K − 1)T +K linear
constraints. Furthermore, the coefficients of the model are polynomial in the input size of the contracting
problem as they relate to total costs in lot-sizing plans. This convex-quadratic model can be solved in
polynomial time in the number of contracts K by interior-point methods, see for example Ye and Tse
(1989).
A.3 Proofs of Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose there exists an optimal solution where the supplier’s lot-sizing plan does
not satisfy the zero-inventory property. Consequently, there exists a time τ ∈ T such that ISτ−1 > 0
and ySτ = 1. We can strictly improve the contract by shifting I
S
τ−1 units from the origin order(s) to
time τ , leading to a reduction in the total costs by at least H > 0. This contradicts the optimality of
the original lot-sizing plan. Hence, the supplier’s plan must satisfy the zero-inventory property in the
optimal solution.
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose there is an optimal solution where ySτ = 1 and y
R
τ = 0 for some τ ∈ T . The
supplier order must transfer to the retailer at some time, so it must hold that τ < T . Furthermore, as
yRτ = 0 it is feasible to delay the considered supplier order. By shifting the supplier order from time τ
to time τ + 1 the total costs reduce by HxSτ > 0, contradicting optimality.
Proof of Lemma 10. Consider an optimal solution and suppose there exist two supplier setups part of
the same subplan. Let t1 < t2 ∈ T be the time periods of the first of such setups: ySt1 = ySt2 = 1 and
ySt = 0 for all t1 < t < t2. By Lemmas 8 and 9 we conclude that I
S
t1−1 = I
S
t2−1 = 0 and y
R
t1 = y
R
t2 = 1.
By assumption, both setups are part of the same subplan, so it must hold that IRt2−1 > 0. Furthermore,
IRt1−1 = 0 and the origin of these I
R
t2−1 products is the supplier order at time t1, since times t1 and t2
correspond the first occurrence of the described supplier setups.
Now, realise that we can feasibly shift one unit of supply from the retailer’s inventory IRt2−1 to the
supplier and retailer setups at time t2 without invalidating any retailer setups in time periods t1, . . . , t2−1
(for details, see below). This results in a total cost reduction of at least h > 0, contradicting optimality.
Hence, no two supplier setups can be part of the same subplan, implying that an optimal solution results
in the stated decomposition into independent subplans. Note that each subplan must prescribe the
number of retailer setups to ensure that the retailer uses exactly n setups in total.
The feasibility of the described shift is guaranteed by the assumption that dt > 0 for all t ∈ T . The
details are as follows. Arbitrarily follow one unit of supply from the supplier order at time t1 to the
retailer’s inventory at time t2 − 1, which prevents time t2 from being the start of a new independent
subplan. Let τ (t1 ≤ τ < t2) be the time this supply is transferred to the retailer’s level, so xRτ > 0.
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If xRτ = 1 we cannot use this path to remove the considered unit of supply as that would remove
the retailer setup at time τ , causing issues with the fact that the total number of retailer setups is
fixed. However, by assumption we have IRt−1 + x
R
t = I
R
t + dt > I
R
t for all t ∈ T . In particular,
IRτ−1 + 1 = I
R
τ−1 + x
R
τ = I
R
τ + dτ > I
R
τ ≥ 1, implying IRτ−1 > 0. Thus, there exists an alternative supply
path. By repeating this argument and using IRt1−1 = 0, we conclude that there must exist a supply path
for which xRτ > 1. This path can be used to feasibly shift supply.
Proof of Lemma 11. The idea of the proof is as follows. Consider such an optimal independent subplan,
which by definition must have exactly one supplier setup (in the initial period). Hence, all post-initial
demand is supplied from inventory (on the supplier’s or retailer’s level).
If H < h it is strictly optimal to shift as much inventory as possible to the supplier’s level, keeping
the prescribed number of retailer setups in mind. Therefore, an optimal subplan must satisfy the zero-
inventory property. If H = h the described shifts are weakly optimal, so the zero-inventory property
holds without loss of optimality.
If H > h then it is strictly optimal to shift as much inventory as possible to the retailer’s level.
This implies placing all prescribed retailer setups as early as possible, i.e., in the first n periods, and
reducing the post-initial retailer orders to the minimum of 1 unit of products. This unique optimal
subplan satisfies the zero-inventory property only under very specific conditions.
We continue with a formal proof of the above argument. To simplify notation, we assume without
loss of generality (by independence) that the considered optimal independent subplan spans all time
periods 1, . . . , T . Thus, by definition of the subplan: yS1 = 1, y
S
t = 0 for 1 < t ≤ T , IS0 = IST = 0, yR1 = 1,∑
t∈T y
R
t = n, I
R
0 = I
R
T = 0.
Case I: suppose H ≤ h.
Suppose the optimal subplan does not satisfy the zero-inventory property. Let t2 ∈ T be the first
time that the zero-inventory property is violated, which must be in the retailer’s lot-sizing plan by
Lemma 8. Let 1 ≤ t1 < t2 be the time of the preceding retailer setup, which must exist. Hence, we have
yRt1 = y
R
t2 = 1, y
R
t = 0 for all t1 < t < t2, I
R
t1−1 = 0, and I
R
t2−1 > 0. We emphasize that by assumption
dt1 > 0 so x
R
t1 > I
R
t2−1 must hold, which is essential.
Now, shift IRt2−1 units of inventory to the supplier instead of the retailer as follows. We reduce the
retailer order at time t1 by I
R
t2−1 and keep these units in the supplier’s inventory, resulting in a change
in total costs of (H − h)(t2 − t1)IRt2−1 ≤ 0. If H < h then this is a strict inequality, which contradicts
optimality. If H = h then this shift does not affect the total costs, but removes this violation of the zero-
inventory property. By repeating this argument, an optimal subplan can be constructed which satisfies
the zero-inventory property.
Case II: suppose H > h.
First, we show that all post-initial retailer orders must be the minimum of 1 unit of products. Suppose
1 < τ ≤ T exists such that xRτ > 1. Shift a unit of supply from the retailer order at time τ to time
1, resulting in change in costs of (τ − 1)(h −H) < 0. This contradicts optimality, so it must hold that
xRt ∈ B for all 1 < t ≤ T .
Second, we prove that all n retailer setups must be in the first n periods. Suppose there exist t1, t2 ∈ T
with t2 > t1 + 1, x
R
t1 = x
R
t2 = 1, and x
R
t = 0 for all t1 < t < t2. Shifting the retailer order from time t2 to
t1 + 1 results in a change in costs of (h−H)(t2− t1− 1) < 0, which contradicts optimality. We conclude
that all n retailer setups are in the first n periods.
To conclude this case, if H > h there is a unique optimal solution given as follows (see Figure 2).
The retailer setups are all in the first n periods: yRt = 1 if and only if 1 ≤ t ≤ n. All post-initial retailer
orders have size 1: xRt = 1 for all 1 < t ≤ n. All remaining demand is supplied from the retailer’s
inventory, by the order in the initial period: xR1 =
∑
t∈T dt− (n− 1). The total costs for the subplan are
F + nf + (H − h)
n∑
t=1
(t− 1) + h
T∑
t=1
(t− 1)dt.
This subplan, the unique optimum, satisfies the zero-inventory property if and only if n = 1, or n = T
and dt = 1 for all 1 < t ≤ T . Note that if the subplan spans a subset of the time periods, these
expressions need to be trivially adjusted accordingly.
Proof of Theorem 12. The dynamic-programming (DP) algorithm that provides optimal solutions for all
n-plan generation problems is based on Zangwill (1969). From Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 we know that
we need to solve several joint lot-sizing problems where the number of retailer setups is fixed to 1, . . . , T .
The DP relies on the fact that any optimal solution is decomposable into independent subplans, see
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Lemma 10. By considering all possible decompositions, we can determine an optimal solution. As such,
we need to solve the corresponding subproblems, for which we use the insights of Lemma 11.
We now present the DP algorithm. The DP states are (
¯
t, n) which corresponds to the joint lot-sizing
problem with time periods {¯t, . . . , T} ⊆ T and prescribes having exactly 1 ≤ n ≤ T retailer setups. Let
v(
¯
t, n) be the corresponding optimal objective value. Thus, our list of optimal plans follows from the
states (1, n) with n = 1, . . . , T .
We also need states related to the subproblems. For the subproblems, we have DP states (
¯
t, t¯, n) which
corresponds to the joint lot-sizing problem with time periods {¯t, . . . , t¯} ⊆ T and where the number of
retailer setups is fixed to 1 ≤ n ≤ T . Let w(
¯
t, t¯, n) be the optimal objective value minus supplier setup
cost F of the corresponding optimal independent subplan.
The DP initialisation is given by
v(
¯
t, 1) = F + w(
¯
t, T, 1),
where we consider all feasible states: 1 ≤
¯
t ≤ T . That is, if only a single retailer setup is allowed, it must
be an independent subplan. The DP recursion is:
v(
¯
t, n) = F + min
{
w(
¯
t, T, n), min
¯
t≤τ<T
{
min
1≤m≤1+τ−¯t
n+τ−T≤m≤n−1
{w(
¯
t, τ,m) + v(τ + 1, n−m)}}},
where we consider all feasible states (n = 1 is the initialisation): 1 ≤
¯
t ≤ T and 1 < n ≤ (1 + T −
¯
t).
Essentially, the DP recursion compares the non-decomposable subplan (
¯
t, T, n) to all other feasibly
decomposable subplans.
The solutions to the subproblems can be determined as follows. First, if only a single retailer setup
is allowed (n = 1), there is a single feasible solution. We have for all feasible states 1 ≤
¯
t ≤ t¯ ≤ T :
w(
¯
t, t¯, 1) = f + h
t¯∑
t=
¯
t
(t−
¯
t)dt.
Next, we use Lemma 11 and need to consider two cases. If H > h then we directly know the unique
optimal solution and obtain
w(
¯
t, t¯, n) = nf + (H − h)
n∑
t=1
(t− 1) + h
t¯∑
t=
¯
t
(t−
¯
t)dt,
where we consider all feasible states (except n = 1): 1 ≤
¯
t < t¯ ≤ T and 1 < n ≤ (1 + t¯−
¯
t).
Otherwise, if H ≤ h there exists an optimal solution that satisfies the zero-inventory property and
we can use a straightforward modification of the standard joint lot-sizing DP:
w(
¯
t, t¯, n) = min
¯
t≤τ≤t¯+1−n
{(
f + h
τ∑
t=
¯
t
(t−
¯
t)dt +H(τ + 1−
¯
t)
t¯∑
t=τ+1
dt
)
+ w(τ + 1, t¯, n− 1)
}
,
where we consider all feasible states (except n = 1): 1 ≤
¯
t < t¯ ≤ T and 1 < n ≤ (1 + t¯−
¯
t).
The optimal plans are constructed by keeping track of the optimal choices made during the DP.
It remains to determine the complexity of this DP. Precomputing the summations of demand takes
O(T 2) time. The calculation of one w(
¯
t, t¯, n) value then takes at most O(T ) time, leading to O(T 4)
time to determine w. Next, one v(
¯
t, n) value needs O(T 2) time, resulting in O(T 4) time for a complete
specification of v. Thus, the total complexity is polynomial, namely O(T 4) time.
Proof of Theorem 13. First, realise that solving all n-plan generation problems results in a list of T
plans, so the number of contracts K is equal to T and is polynomial in the input size. The theorem now
follows immediately by combining Theorems 7 and 12.
Proof of Lemma 14. If ω is a uniform distribution the plan assignment model can be reformulated into
a convex model. We refer to the proof of Theorem 7 for the model and its dual variables. We will use
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (see Karush (1939) and Kuhn and Tucker (1951)) to prove
the lemma.
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For dual feasibility, all dual variables λk (k ∈ {0, . . . ,K}) and µk,k+1 (k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}) must be
non-negative. The KKT stationarity condition for z1 is
1−
K∑
k=0
λk = 0. (34)
The stationarity conditions for θ¯k, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, are
0 ∈ 1
θ¯ −
¯
θ
(
2(nk − nk+1)θ¯k +
(
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck+1 + cpubk+1)− (nk − nk+1)θ¯
))
+
(
nk − ∂φ∗(θ¯k)
)
λk + (nk − nk+1)
K∑
i=k+1
λi − µk−1,k + µk,k+1. (35)
Here, we need the subdifferential ∂φ∗(θ¯k), since φ∗ is not differentiable in all points. In our case, ∂φ∗(θ¯k)
is the closed interval
∂φ∗(θ¯k) =
[
lim
θk↓θ¯k
d
dθk
φ∗(θk), lim
θk↑θ¯k
d
dθk
φ∗(θk)
]
.
Hence, in the optimal solution there exist subgradients, for simplicity denoted by d
dθ¯k
φ∗(θ¯k) ∈ ∂φ∗(θ¯k)
for k ∈ K, such that (35) is satisfied. In other words, for these subgradients it must hold that
θ¯k =
(Ck+1 + c
pub
k+1)− (Ck + cpubk )
2(nk − nk+1) +
1
2
(
θ¯ − (θ¯ −
¯
θ)
K∑
i=k+1
λi
)
− (θ¯ − ¯θ)
2(nk − nk+1)
((
nk − d
dθ¯k
φ∗(θ¯k)
)
λk − µk−1,k + µk,k+1
)
. (36)
Now consider k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1} such that φ∗ has no slopes n∗ with nk−1 > n∗ > nk+1. If plan k is
assigned, we have θ¯k > θ¯k−1 and µk−1,k = 0. Substituting (36) in θ¯k > θ¯k−1 results in the condition
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck−1 + cpubk−1)
2(nk−1 − nk) +
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck+1 + cpubk+1)
2(nk − nk+1)
+
(θ¯ −
¯
θ)
2(nk − nk+1)
((
nk+1 − d
dθ¯k
φ∗(θ¯k)
)
λk + µk,k+1
)
+
(θ¯ −
¯
θ)
2(nk−1 − nk)
(
−
(
nk−1 − d
dθ¯k−1
φ∗(θ¯k−1)
)
λk−1 + µk−2,k−1
)
< 0. (37)
Note that the summations over λi almost cancel out: only λk remains which explains why the term
nk+1λk is present. We claim that the terms in (37) containing λk−1 and λk are non-negative.
First, if λk−1 > 0 then the IR constraint binds at θ¯k−1. This is only possible if nk−1 ≥ ddθ¯k−1φ∗(θ¯k−1).
If nk−1 = ddθ¯k−1φ
∗(θ¯k−1), then the term with λk−1 is zero. Otherwise, if nk−1 > ddθ¯k−1φ
∗(θ¯k−1), we get a
contradiction with our assumptions. Namely, in this case it must hold that limθk−1↓θ¯k−1
d
dθk−1
φ∗(θk−1) ≤
nk+1 < nk as there are no larger eligible slopes of φ
∗ by assumption. Assigning plan k will violate the
IR constraints, which leads to a contradiction. We conclude that
(
nk−1 − ddθ¯k−1φ∗(θ¯k−1)
)
λk−1 = 0.
Second, if λk > 0 then nk >
d
dθ¯k
φ∗(θ¯k), where the inequality is strict since nk is not a slope of φ∗. In
particular, it must hold that d
dθ¯k
φ∗(θ¯k) ≤ nk+1. This proves our claim.
Thus, all terms with dual variables in (37) are non-negative. Therefore, the other terms must be
strictly negative in total, i.e., (27) must hold.
Proof of Lemma 15. First of all, realise that maxτ∈T {(τ − 1)
∑T
t=τ dt} is the maximum inventory that
can be rerouted to a new supplier setup. So the assumption on the supplier’s setup cost implies that it is
never optimal to have more than a single supplier setup in a lot-sizing plan. Consequently, any optimal
solution for the n-plan generation problem always has total costs
F +
(∑
t∈T
(t− 1)dt − n
)
H (38)
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for the supplier. Only the number of retailer setups can be minimised. Let mk ∈ N≥1 be the number of
retailer setups of the optimal nk-plan.
Suppose we have determined a minimal list of plans sufficient for optimality for the contracting
problem. Hence, each of these plans is assigned to retailer types. Add to this list the following T plans
if not yet present: for m ∈ {1, . . . , T} add any m-extreme plan, i.e., a plan that has minimal retailer
inventory with m retailer setups. Denote the indices of the combined list by K and the resulting indices
of the extreme plans by L ⊆ K. It can be verified from the properties of φ∗ that the slopes of φ∗ are
contained in {nl : l ∈ L}.
By definition of the extreme plans, we have n1 =
∑
t∈T (t − 1)dt, nK = 0, and 1,K ∈ L. By our
assumptions, and consequently by (38), all m-extreme plans have the same supplier’s costs and retailer’s
public costs for fixed m. Therefore, it does not matter which m-extreme plan is added. Also, any two
extreme plans in L have different amounts of retailer inventory: the plan with the most retailer setups
has the lowest retailer inventory. This trivially follows from adding retailer setups to the plan with less
retailer setups, which must decrease the retailer inventory.
Consider a non-extreme plan k ∈ K\L, so 1 < k < K holds. Realise that we can apply Lemma 14 to
this plan. If this plan would be assigned in the optimal menu, then Lemma 14 states that the following
condition must be met:
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck−1 + cpubk−1)
nk−1 − nk +
(Ck + c
pub
k )− (Ck+1 + cpubk+1)
nk − nk+1 < 0
⇐⇒ (nk−1 − nk)H + (mk −mk−1)f
nk−1 − nk +
(nk+1 − nk)H + (mk −mk+1)f
nk − nk+1 < 0
⇐⇒ mk −mk−1
nk−1 − nk +
mk −mk+1
nk − nk+1 < 0. (39)
Define
¯
k, k¯ ∈ L such that n
¯
k > nk > nk¯ and mk¯ = m
¯
k + 1, so
¯
k < k < k¯. Note that these must exist.
By definition, (39) must hold for each
¯
k < k < k¯. Adding these inequalities results in
m
¯
k+1 −m
¯
k
n
¯
k − n
¯
k+1
+
mk¯−1 −mk¯
nk¯−1 − nk¯
< 0,
as all interior terms cancel out. We claim that this is a contradiction. By definition, n
¯
k is the minimum
amount of retailer inventory when using m
¯
k retailer setups, and likewise for nk¯ and mk¯. Since nk < n
¯
k
for all k >
¯
k it follows that mk > m
¯
k for k >
¯
k. Also, by definition we have mk¯ = m
¯
k + 1 and, as a
consequence, mk ≥ mk¯ for k > ¯k. By combining these insights, we obtain the following contradiction:
0 >
m
¯
k+1 −m
¯
k
n
¯
k − n
¯
k+1
+
mk¯−1 −mk¯
nk¯−1 − nk¯
≥ 1
n
¯
k − n
¯
k+1
> 0.
We conclude that we only need to include plans which have minimal retailer inventory for each number
of retailer setups.
Proof of Lemma 16. Recall that under the assumptions all m-extreme plan have the same supplier’s
costs and retailer’s public costs for fixed m. Therefore, we only need to determine a plan that minimises
the retailer’s inventory and uses exactly m retailer setups. The dynamic-programming (DP) algorithm is
as follows. The DP states are (
¯
t,m), which corresponds to the joint lot-sizing problem with time periods
{¯t, . . . , T} ⊆ T and prescribes having exactly 1 ≤ m ≤ T retailer setups. The corresponding minimal
retailer inventory is denoted by v(
¯
t,m). Hence, our list of extreme plans follows from the states (1,m)
with m = 1, . . . , T .
The DP initialisation for 1 ≤
¯
t ≤ T is
v(
¯
t, 1) =
T∑
t=
¯
t
(t−
¯
t)dt.
The DP recursion is given by
v(
¯
t,m) = min
¯
t≤τ≤T+1−m
{ τ∑
t=
¯
t
(t−
¯
t)dt + v(τ + 1,m− 1)
}
,
where we consider all feasible states (except m = 1): 1 ≤
¯
t < T and 1 < m ≤ (1 + T −
¯
t).
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The plans are constructed by keeping track of the optimal choices made during the DP algorithm.
Precomputing the summations of demand takes O(T 2) time. The calculation of each DP state then
requires O(T ) time, leading to O(T 3) time in total for the algorithm.
Proof of Corollary 17. By Lemma 15 it is sufficient for optimality to use a list consisting of an m-extreme
plan for each m ∈ {1, . . . , T}. This list consists of T plans and it can be constructed in polynomial time
by Lemma 16. Thus, the number of contracts K is equal to T and polynomial in the input size. The
result now follows from Theorem 7.
B Example for private setup cost
In this appendix we give an example for the private setup cost case where the optimal menu assigns a
contract that violates the zero-inventory property. We consider the smallest example by setting T = 2,
d1 = 1, and d2 = 2, see Figure 4 for the optimal solution for each n-plan generation problem. Note that
the plan in Figure 4a does not satisfy the zero-inventory property.
(1) (2)
3
2
1
1
1
(a) n = 2, H > h,
F > H + h.
(1) (2)
3
1
2
2
(b) n = 2, H ≤ h,
F > 2H.
(1) (2)
1
1
2
2
(c) n = 2, F ≤ 2H,
F ≤ H + h.
(1) (2)
3
3
2
(d) n = 1.
Figure 4: The optimal solutions for the n-plan generation problems in the case of private setup cost with
T = 2, d1 = 1, and d2 = 2.
The cost parameters are as follows:
¯
θ = 1, θ¯ = 5, F = 4, H = 2, and h = 1. It is trivial to verify
that the default option φ∗ is given by
φ∗(θ) =
{
2θ if θ ∈ [1, 2]
θ + 2 if θ ∈ (2, 5] .
Since H > h and F > H + h the plan in Figure 4a is the only optimum for n = 2. Furthermore, we let
ω be a uniform distribution. For the first contract we have n1 = 2 retailer setups, C1 = F +H = 6, and
cpub1 = h = 1. For the second contract these parameters are n2 = 1, C2 = F = 4, and c
pub
2 = 2h = 2.
If the optimal θ¯1 lies in [1, 2), then the first segment of φ
∗ binds. By (19) and (21) the side payments
must be
z2 = c
pub
2 + n2¯
θ2 − φ∗(
¯
θ2) = 2 + θ¯1 − 2θ¯1 = 2− θ¯1,
z1 = z2 + c
pub
1 − cpub2 + (n1 − n2)¯θ2 = (2− θ¯1) + 1− 2 + θ¯1 = 1.
Consequently, the objective function is
1
θ¯−
¯
θ
(
(θ¯1 −
¯
θ)(C1 + z1) + (θ¯ − θ¯1)(C2 + z2)
)
= 14
(
θ¯21 − 4θ¯1 + 23
)
.
Since the derivative is 14 (2θ¯1 − 4) < 0 on [1, 2), it is optimal set θ¯1 as large as possible in [1, 2).
If the optimal θ¯1 lies in (2, 5], then the second segment of φ
∗ binds. Similar to the previous case,
this leads to side payments z2 = 2 + θ¯1 − (θ¯1 + 2) = 0 and z1 = θ¯1 − 1. The resulting objective function
is 14 (θ¯
2
1 + 15), which has strictly positive derivative on (2, 5]. Hence, it is optimal to set θ¯1 as small as
possible in (2, 5].
Finally, it can be similarly verified that if θ¯1 = 2, then z1 = 1, z2 = 0, and the objective value is
19
4 . This corresponds to the limits of the above two cases. We conclude that this is the unique optimal
solution, which assigns the plan in Figure 4a to types [1, 2] and the plan in Figure 4d to types [2, 5].
Thus, the optimal menu assigns a plan that violates the zero-inventory property.
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C Relaxing the demand assumption
If demand can be zero certain results are no longer valid or need to be adjusted. This appendix describes
the required changes. In Assumption 1 we state the properties of the considered demand.
Assumption 1. The (integer) demand is strictly positive in the first and last period, and non-negative
otherwise, i.e., d1, dT ∈ N>0 and dt ∈ N for 1 < t < T .
Since we have time-independent costs, the assumption d1, dT > 0 is without loss of generality. If either
is zero, that period can be removed from the problem. Under Assumption 1 only the results for the plan
generation for private setup cost are significantly affected, i.e., Lemmas 10 and 11, and Theorem 12. To
address the issues we condition on whether H ≤ h (Section C.1) or H > h (Section C.2). Before we do
so, we mention the minor adjustments needed for the other results.
Throughout our results and proofs we use that the number of retailer setups lies between 1 and T .
If some demand is zero, there is a maximum feasible number of retailer setups 1 ≤ K ≤ T , which should
be used instead. This has no significant impact on the results. Furthermore, dummy setups (with zero
order quantity) need to be prevented in any dynamic-programming algorithm. This slight adjustment
does not affect the complexity results.
For the remainder of this appendix we consider the plan generation problem for private setup cost f
under Assumption 1. For the proofs we often refer to or reuse parts of the proofs for Lemmas 10 and
11, and Theorem 12.
C.1 Case H ≤ h
This case is more regular and essentially all results still hold. In Lemma 18 we will show that any plan
assigned in the optimal menu must satisfy the zero-inventory property (and thus be decomposable). This
lemma replaces Lemmas 10 and 11 for this case, and leads to the same overall conclusion. Consequently,
Theorem 12 is unaffected and this case is solvable in O(T 4) time by dynamic programming. We continue
with the lemma and its proof.
Lemma 18. Under Assumption 1, private setup cost f , and H ≤ h, it suffices for optimality for the
contracting problem to restrict the plan generation to plans satisfying the zero-inventory property.
Proof. The idea is as follows. First, we show that without loss of optimality an optimal n-plan violates
the zero-inventory property only if n is strictly larger than the maximum slope of φ∗. This implies that
this plan has unnecessary many retailer setups. Next, we show that such plans are never assigned in an
optimal menu. The details are given below.
Part 1: violating the zero-inventory property implies a larger slope than φ∗.
We first introduce some notation. For t ∈ T with IRt−1 > 0 we can backtrack the flow of a unit of
products from the inventory IRt−1 to its origin at the supplier. At some time period τ ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}
this unit of products is transferred from the supplier to the retailer by a retailer order, which we call the
transfer time. Since there can be multiple options when backtracking, we define the indices L(t) such
that {τl : l ∈ L(t)} ⊆ {1, . . . , t− 1} are all possible transfer times for a unit of products of the inventory
IRt−1. That is, any path in the network flow graph from the supplier to the retailer’s inventory I
R
t−1
transfers to the retailer’s layer at some time τl, l ∈ L(t). By definition, we have xRτl ≥ 1 for all l ∈ L(t).
We denote the first and last transfer times by τ1(t) and τL(t), respectively.
Suppose an optimal solution to the n-plan generation problem exists that violates the zero-inventory
property, say at time t1 ∈ T (and potentially elsewhere). By Lemma 8 this implies that 1 < t1 ≤ T ,
xRt1 > 0, and I
R
t1−1 > 0.
If l ∈ L(t1) with xRτl > 1 exists, then we can reduce the inventory IRt1−1 by shifting a unit of products
to the supplier’s inventory at time τl instead of the retailer’s inventory (see Figure 5a). The costs change
by (t1 − τl)(H − h) ≤ 0. Since τl < t1 this contradicts optimality if H < h, otherwise (if H = h) we can
exclude this solution without loss of optimality. Hence, for any time t ∈ T where the plan violates the
zero-inventory property (xRt > 0 and I
R
t−1 > 0) it must hold that x
R
τl
= 1 for all l ∈ L(t).
Suppose there exists a time t ∈ T with yRt = 0, IRt−1 > 0, and xRτl(t) > 1 for some l ∈ L(t). See also
Figure 5b. Decrease IRt1−1 by shifting one unit of the flow through the latest time τL(t1) to the supplier’s
inventory instead. This removes the retailer setup at time τL(t1), but still leads to a feasible plan with
a change in costs of (H − h)(t1 − τL(t1)) ≤ 0. Reinsert the removed retailer setup at time t and shift
a single unit of products from time τl(t) < t (which has x
R
τl(t)
> 1 by assumption) to this new setup.
The result is a feasible n-plan with a change in costs of (H − h)(t − τl(t)) + (H − h)(t1 − τL(t1)) ≤ 0,
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compared to the original n-plan. This contradicts the optimality of the original plan if H < h or we can
exclude it without loss of optimality (H = h).
Thus, by combining the above, we have for all t ∈ T with IRt−1 > 0 that xRτl = 1 for all l ∈ L(t).
Suppose there exists t ∈ T with dt > 0 and yRt = 0, which implies that IRt−1 > 0. Hence, xRτl = 1 for all
l ∈ L(t) must hold. Realise that this is only possible if dτ1(t) = 0. We can reposition this retailer setup
at time τ1(t) to time t resulting in a change in costs of (H − h)(t − τ1(t)) ≤ 0. Again, this results in a
contradiction to optimality (H < h) or can be excluded without loss of optimality (H = h).
We conclude that yRt = 1 for all t ∈ T with dt > 0. Furthermore, it must hold that dτ1(t1) = 0 as
xRτ1(t1) = 1. Therefore, the plan must have strictly more retailer setups than the number of time periods
with strictly positive demand. In other words, the plan has enough retailer setups to directly satisfy all
demand without any retailer inventory. However, there are redundant retailer setups (such as at τ1(t1))
that only increase the number of retailer setups and lead to higher costs for both the supplier and the
retailer. Consequently, the number of retailer setups n of this optimal plan exceeds the maximum slope
of φ∗, which is essential.
(τl) (t1)
−
+
− −
+
−
+
+
(a) Without changing retailer setups.
(τL(t1)) (t1) (τl(t)) (t)
×
−
+
−
+
+ −
− −
+ +
X
· · ·
· · ·
(b) A retailer setup is removed at time τL(t1) and
reinserted at time t.
Figure 5: Shifting flow in procurement plans. Reduced flows are red, increased flows are blue, purple
setups are removed, and green setups are new.
Part 2: plans violating the zero-inventory property are not assigned in an optimal menu.
Suppose the considered plan, which violates the zero-inventory property, is assigned to retailer types
in an optimal solution to the contracting problem. Let it be the k-th contract in the optimal menu and
let nk denote its number of retailer setups. By Lemma 6 we assume without loss of generality that the
(k+ 1)-th contract has a plan with one less retailer setup, nk+1 = nk − 1, but is potentially not assigned
to retailer types. Consider the k-th plan and remove a unit of inventory from IRt1−1, remove the retailer
setup at time τL(t1), and shift that supply to the supplier’s inventory. We obtain a feasible (nk−1)-plan
with a change in costs of (H − h)(t1 − τL(t1)) ≤ 0. Hence, it must hold that
Ck+1 + c
pub
k+1 ≤ Ck + cpubk + (H − h)(t1 − τL(t1)) ≤ Ck + cpubk .
By also using (21), we have
Ck+1 + zk+1 = Ck+1 + c
pub
k+1 − cpubk+1 + zk+1 ≤ Ck + cpubk − cpubk+1 + zk+1
= Ck + zk − (nk − nk+1)
¯
θk+1 < Ck + zk. (40)
Thus, keeping the side payments zk+1, . . . , zK constant and replacing the k-th contract by the (k + 1)-
th leads to a strictly better objective value when considered in isolation. In terms of the partition,
we only change
¯
θk+1 to
¯
θk, so the k-th contract is no longer assigned. However, the side payments of
contracts 1, . . . , k also need to be adjusted for feasibility. This can be done by decreasing z1, . . . , zk by
(nk − nk+1)(
¯
θk+1 −
¯
θk) > 0 according to (21). Namely, consider (21) for k+ 1. Since
¯
θk+1 is changed to
¯
θk, zk needs to decrease by (nk − nk+1)(
¯
θk+1 −
¯
θk). Now consider (21) for k. As
¯
θk remains unchanged,
we need to decrease zk−1 by (nk − nk+1)(
¯
θk+1 −
¯
θk). The previous argument also holds for all contracts
1, . . . , k− 1. Graphically, we are shifting all lines 1, . . . , k vertically upwards such that the k-th line is no
longer essential for the lower envelope. By (40) and the decrease in side payments, these modifications
improve the objective value. All these modifications to the menu are feasible with respect to the IR
constraints, since the plans of all contracts 1, . . . , k + 1 have a slope of at least the maximum slope of
φ∗. The latter property is essential for this argument.
We conclude that we have constructed a strictly better feasible menu where the considered k-th
contract is not assigned to retailer types. This contradiction implies that it suffices for optimality for the
contracting problem to restrict the plan generation to plans that satisfy the zero-inventory property.
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C.2 Case H > h
In this case, there are instances for which any optimal n-plan is non-decomposable into independent
subplans for certain values of n. For example, by appropriately choosing H > h, M , and F , the plan in
Figure 6a is the unique optimum. In particular, for any H > h this example can be extended such that
the optimum is non-decomposable. Thus, Lemma 10 does not hold in general. The details are as follows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M + 1 M − 1 M + 2
M
1
1
1
M − 1 M + 1
1
1
1 1
(a) Non-decomposable solution.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M M M + 2
M M M
2 1
1 1
(b) Decomposable solution.
Figure 6: Two possible solutions for the 5-plan generation problem in the case of private setup cost with
T = 6, d = (M, 0,M,M, 1, 1).
For given H and h with H > h, let T ≥ 6 be such that
H >
T − 3
T − 5h,
and set the demand to d = (M, 0,M,M, 1, . . . , 1) for some M ∈ N>0 large enough. The parameters M
and F are chosen such that it is optimal to have a supplier setup only at the time periods with demand
M , i.e., time periods 1, 3, and 4.
Now consider the (T − 1)-plan generation problem. Any plan that does not have a supplier and
retailer setup at times 1, 3, and 4 is suboptimal due to the choice of M and the resulting large holding
costs. Suppose an optimal (T−1)-plan does not have a retailer setup at time 2, then it must have retailer
setups in all other periods (similar to Figure 6b). Perform the following shift to obtain a feasible plan
similar to Figure 6a. Shift the supply provided by xRT to x
R
4 , reposition the retailer setup at time T to
time 2, and set xR2 = 1 by shifting a unit of supply from the orders at time 3 to time 1. This leads to
a change in costs of (h −H)(T − 4) + (H + h) = h(T − 3) −H(T − 5) < 0 by choice of T . From this
contradiction to optimality, we conclude that any optimal (T − 1)-plan is non-decomposable.
There are also instances where this non-decomposable plan is necessary for optimality for the contract-
ing problem, i.e., any solution can be improved by adding it to the menu. For example, let ω be a uniform
distribution and take T = 6, d = (20, 0, 20, 20, 1, 1), F = 20, H = 7, h = 2, and f ∈ [1, 20] = Θ. These
parameters satisfy the conditions given above, so contract 2 with n2 = T − 1 = 5 is non-decomposable.
Furthermore, an optimal solution is to assign contracts 2, 3, and 4 (with n2 = 5, n3 = 4, and n4 = 3) to
retailer types [1, 2], [2, 4], and [4, 20], respectively. The side payments are z = (3, 6, 2, 0, 24, 172) and the
optimal objective value is 62. Removing the non-decomposable plan from the menu, leads to an optimal
objective value of approximately 62.1, showing the necessity to include this plan.
With these insights, we provide a dynamic-programming algorithm to solve all n-plan generation
problems. The running time is polynomial, namely O(T 5). The presented algorithm suffices for our goal
to show that this case is also efficiently solvable. The result is stated in Lemma 19.
Lemma 19. Under Assumption 1, private setup cost f , and H > h, solving all n-plan generation
problems can be done in O(T 5) time by dynamic programming.
Proof. For H > h and some demand being zero, the optimal n-plan solution might be non-decomposable
into independent subproblems (recall the example in Figure 6a). Therefore, a new approach is needed.
The idea is as follows.
First, we show that an optimal plan consists of substructures as illustrated in Figure 7, which is
similar to Figure 2. In particular, the optimal solution is fixed when we are given the supplier setups and
how many retailer setups occur in between the supplier setups. Here, it is essential that H > h, so we
know that as much inventory as possible is placed at the retailer (without invalidating retailer setups).
Next, we describe a dynamic-programming (DP) algorithm similar to that in the proof of Theorem 12.
Since we might have a non-decomposable solution, we need to add the available inventory to the DP
states. In an optimal solution these inventory states are non-zero only if removing that inventory would
lead to dummy retailer setups. Hence, the inventory states are bounded by T , which is essential to obtain
a polynomial-time algorithm. Below we give all the details.
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(ti) (ti + 1) (ti + ni − 1) (ti+1)
ni − 1
1
ni − 2 1
1
· · ·
· · · · · ·
Figure 7: The unique optimal substructure in the case of private setup cost and H > h. There are
sequential supplier setups at time periods ti and ti+1, and ni retailer setups in time periods ti, . . . , ti+1−1.
Part 1: properties of the optimal n-plan.
Consider an optimal solution of the n-plan generation problem. Assume that t1 < t2 ∈ T exist such
that ySt1 = y
S
t2 = 1 and y
S
t = 0 for t1 < t < t2. By Lemmas 8 and 9 we know that I
S
t1−1 = I
S
t2−1 = 0 and
yRt1 = y
R
t2 = 1. Let n1 ∈ {1, . . . , t2 − t1} be the number of retailer setups in t1, . . . , t2 − 1. Note that if
such t1 and t2 do not exist, then the optimum is an independent subplan and we can apply Lemma 11
to obtain similar properties as derived below.
First, we show that all retailer orders in periods t1 + 1, . . . , t2 − 1 must be the minimum of 1 unit of
products. Suppose t1 < τ < t2 exists such that x
R
τ > 1. These products are satisfied from the supplier’s
inventory. Shift a unit of supply from the retailer order at time τ to time t1, resulting in change in costs
of (τ − t1)(h−H) < 0. This contradicts optimality, so it must hold that xRt ∈ B for all t1 < t < t2.
Second, we prove that all n1 retailer setups must be in the initial periods. Suppose there exist
t1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < t2 with τ2 > τ1 + 1, xRτ1 = xRτ2 = 1, and xRt = 0 for all τ1 < t < τ2. Again, these products
are satisfied from the supplier’s inventory. Shifting the retailer order from time τ2 to τ1 + 1 results in
a change in costs of (h − H)(τ2 − τ1 − 1) < 0, which contradicts optimality. We conclude that all n1
retailer setups are in the first n1 periods of the considered time periods.
For the considered optimal solution we have for some N ∈ {1, . . . , T} the supplier setups t1, . . . , tN ∈
T and the number of retailer setups n1, . . . , nN ∈ {1, . . . , T} such that ni retailer setups take place in
time periods ti, . . . , ti+1 − 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and nN in tN , . . . , T . From the above, we must have
xSti > 0, x
R
ti > 0, x
R
ti+1 = · · · = xRti+ni−1 = 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and zero otherwise. See also Figure 7.
Now realise that the retailer order xRti needs to be minimal in the optimal solution. Otherwise there
is unnecessary retailer inventory at time ti+1 − 1 which can be transferred to the supplier and retailer
setup at time ti+1. This strictly reduces the total costs, contradicting optimality. The minimal order
xRti is at least 1 (to keep it a valid setup) and is such that all demand in ti, . . . , ti+1 − 1 is satisfied,
taking into account the supply from any available inventory IRti−1 and any additional retailer setups
xRti+1 = · · · = xRti+ni−1 = 1.
In particular, if IRti−1 >
∑i−1
j=1 nj for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then the retailer inventory IRti−1 can
be reduced, which contradicts optimality. Namely, consider the artificial situation that dt = 0 for all
1 ≤ t < ti. The
∑i−1
j=1 nj retailer setups need to provide at least 1 supply each, which is transferred by
retailer inventory IRti−1 to time ti. If more inventory is supplied, then a unit of products can be shifted
from a previous order to the order at time ti, without invalidating a retailer setup. This strictly reduces
the costs, proving the claim. Note that a better bound exists, but this suffices to obtain polynomial
running time.
Part 2: the dynamic-programming algorithm.
We can now formulate a DP algorithm with a polynomial running time that solves all n-plan gener-
ation problems. The DP states are (
¯
t, n,min) which corresponds to the joint lot-sizing subproblem with
time periods {¯t, . . . , T} ⊆ T and prescribes having exactly 1 ≤ n ≤ T retailer setups. Furthermore, the
supplier inventory satisfies IS
¯
t−1 = I
S
T = 0 and for the retailer inventory we have I
R
¯
t−1 = min ∈ {0, . . . ,¯t−1}
and IRT = 0. Note that the bound on min follows from the above arguments on minimal remaining in-
ventory. Let v(
¯
t, n,min) be the corresponding optimal objective value. Our list of optimal plans follows
from the states (1, n, 0) with n = 1, . . . , T (or up to the maximum feasible number of retailer setups).
We also need states (
¯
t, t¯, n,min) for
¯
t ≤ t¯ ∈ T , n ∈ {1, . . . , 1 + t¯ −
¯
t}, and min ∈ {0, . . . ,
¯
t − 1} as
follows. They correspond to subproblems spanning time periods
¯
t, . . . , t¯ with a supplier setup only at
time
¯
t: yS
¯
t = 1 and y
S
t = 0 for ¯
t < t ≤ t¯. Furthermore, there are exactly n retailer setups: ∑t¯t=
¯
t y
R
t = n.
Finally, the supplier inventory satisfies IS
¯
t−1 = I
S
t¯ = 0 and for the retailer inventory we have I
R
¯
t−1 = min.
By the above analysis there exists a unique optimal subplan for each feasible state (
¯
t, t¯, n,min).
Let w(
¯
t, t¯, n,min) denote the corresponding costs. Furthermore, we have the corresponding (minimal)
remaining inventory IRt¯ denoted by mout(¯
t, t¯, n,min). Any infeasible states are assigned the value infinity,
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i.e., they are omitted when determining the optimal plans.
The DP initialisation for feasible states is given by
v(
¯
t, 1,min) = w(
¯
t, T, 1,min).
The DP recursion for feasible states is:
v(
¯
t, n,min) = min
{
w(
¯
t, T, n,min),
min
¯
t≤τ<T
{
min
1≤κ≤n−1
{w(
¯
t, τ, κ,min) + v(τ + 1, n− κ,mout(
¯
t, τ, κ,min))}
}}
.
Certain options in the shown ranges might lead to infeasible states and should be omitted. There are
O(T 3) many DP states and each takes O(T 2) time to compute. Thus, to determine v we need O(T 5)
time.
It remains to solve the subproblems related to w and mout. For a feasible state (
¯
t, t¯, n, 0) the supplier
order must be xS
¯
t = max{n,
∑t¯
t=
¯
t dt} in order to supply all demand in ¯t, . . . , t¯ and to have no dummy
retailer setups. We can construct the corresponding subplan in O(T ) time, from which we obtain IRt ,
t ∈ {¯t, . . . , t¯}, and in particular the remaining inventory mout(
¯
t, t¯, n, 0). The corresponding costs are
w(
¯
t, t¯, n, 0) = F + nf +H
n∑
t=1
(t− 1) + h
t¯∑
t=
¯
t
IRt .
Thus, calculating w(
¯
t, t¯, n, 0) and mout(
¯
t, t¯, n, 0) for all
¯
t, t¯, and n takes O(T 4) time. The other feasible
states follow from
w(
¯
t, t¯, n,m+ 1) =
{
w(
¯
t, t¯, n,m) if xR
¯
t > 1 in state (¯
t, t¯, n,m)
w(
¯
t, t¯, n,m) + h(1 + t¯−
¯
t) otherwise
,
mout(
¯
t, t¯, n,m+ 1) =
{
mout(
¯
t, t¯, n,m) if xR
¯
t > 1 in state (¯
t, t¯, n,m)
mout(
¯
t, t¯, n,m) + 1 otherwise
.
That is, if xR
¯
t > 1 and if min increases by 1, then this additional initial inventory is used to satisfy
demand in
¯
t, . . . , t¯. Furthermore, we decrease xS
¯
t and x
R
¯
t by 1. The inventory I
R
t remains unchanged for
t ∈ {¯t, . . . , t¯}. If xR
¯
t = 1, the previously described changes would lead to a dummy retailer setup at time
¯
t. Hence, the additional initial inventory is kept in inventory throughout the subplan.
In total, determining w and mout takes O(T 4) time. Overall, the DP takes O(T 5) time, which can
potentially be reduced since many min values are infeasible or not used.
D Fixed partition model
In this appendix we formulate the fixed partition model. In this model the number of contracts and their
assignment to the retailer types is fixed, but the lot-sizing plans and side payments of these contracts
need to be determined.
For K ∈ N≥1 we are given a K-partition of Θ, denoted by [
¯
θk, θ¯k] with k ∈ K = {1, . . . ,K}. It is
allowed to have
¯
θk = θ¯k, since (the proof of) Lemma 6 also holds for the fixed partition model. The fixed
partition model is given by
min
∑
k∈K
(∫ θ¯k
¯
θk
ω(θ)dθ
)(
F
∑
t∈T
y
S(k)
t +H
∑
t∈T
I
S(k)
t + zk
)
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subject to
I
S(k)
0 = 0, ∀ k ∈ K,
I
S(k)
t−1 + x
S(k)
t = I
S(k)
t + x
R(k)
t , ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
x
S(k)
t ≤MyS(k)t , ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
I
R(k)
0 = I
R(k)
T = 0, ∀ k ∈ K,
I
R(k)
t−1 + x
R(k)
t = I
R(k)
t + dt, ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
y
R(k)
t ≤ xR(k)t ≤MyR(k)t , ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
y
S(k)
t , y
R(k)
t ∈ B, ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
x
S(k)
t , x
R(k)
t , I
S(k)
t , I
R(k)
t ∈ N, ∀ k ∈ K, t ∈ T ,
f(θk)
∑
t∈T
y
R(l)
t + h(θk)
∑
t∈T
I
R(l)
t = φ(xl|θk), ∀ θk ∈ [¯θk, θ¯k], k, l ∈ K,
φ(xk|θk)− zk ≤ φ∗(θk), ∀ θk ∈ [
¯
θk, θ¯k], k ∈ K,
φ(xk|θk)− zk ≤ φ(xl|θk)− zl, ∀ θk ∈ [
¯
θk, θ¯k], k, l ∈ K.
By realising that Lemma 5 is also valid for this model, the IR and IC constraints can be replaced by the
following finitely many constraints:
φ(x1 |¯θ)− z1 ≤ φ∗(
¯
θ),
φ(xk |¯θk)− zk ≤ φ∗(
¯
θk), ∀ k ∈ K \ {1},
φ(xK |θ¯)− zK ≤ φ∗(θ¯),
φ(xk |¯θk)− zk = φ(xk−1 |¯θk)− zk−1, ∀ k ∈ K \ {1}.
The resulting model is a standard mixed integer linear program, provided that we use the linear modelling
of φ∗ as shown in Section 3.2.2.
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